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Abstract
The population of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone has exploded, within twenty-three
years, from thirty thousand to 4.7 million with average 28 percent annual per capita GDP increase.
What city forms have been sustaining this rapid economic and population growth? Why has the
city adopted these forms? The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the historical, cultural,
political, economic, urban planning, and architectural factors that have saliently affected the city
form development of Shenzhen, China, which is illustrated extensively. Zone, City, and Regional
Nexus are three key terms that characterize the three phases of Shenzhen's physical form nature
and the corresponding political roles, economic goals, and urban planning strategy of the city.
This study hypothesizes that Shenzhen's city form development tends to be contested in the Pearl
River Delta region in the midst of globalization, in order to maintain the city's symbiotic economic
predominant posture. A design proposal for the city's future growth is also provided, emphasizing
the principles of livability, public spaces, seafront fabric, and ecological system.
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I. Introduction
The urban form development and arrangement, a process
and an important section of a city's planning strategy, can be
considered as a series of diagrams of dynamic intervening forces
with cultural, economic, political, global, geographical, temporal,
economic, technological, and ecological aspects. It provides a
coherent standpoint from which to study the spatial resource
distribution affecting human perceptions and fulfilling human
visions. An optimized, flexible, controllable, and effective city
form is a vital physical "bone" configuration to uphold a city's
comprehensive functioning and goals.
Research on Chinese urban form development has primarily
been focused on a few cities, particularly former capitals, port
cities, and a few western frontier cities with deep culture and long
histories. Capital cities such as Beijing, Luoyang, Nanjing, and
Xi'an, port cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Qingdao,
and Tianjin, and western frontier cities such as Lanzhou (Figure
11), Kunming, and Hohhot dominate the literature on Chinese
urbanism.
The population of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone has
exploded, within twenty-three years, from thirty thousand to 4.7
million with average 28 percent1 annual GDP increase. What city
form sustains this rapid economic and population growth? Why
does the city adopt this form? City form growth related with
politics, economic development and urban planning strategies of
newly emerged coastal metropolises, Shenzhen after 1979 under
the open door policy, have been touched upon by some authors,
but have never been the subject of a full-scale exposition. The
mechanisms behind the city's form growth and the relationships
between the city's roles and its urban spaces and architecture under
a new economic model since 1979 have not yet been systematically
and comprehensively studied. Nor is there recent work undertaking
such a study, that examines the relations among the active city
form adjustment and planning of Shenzhen, the influence of
globalization, and the city's gradual testing of capitalist elements
and mechanisms as part of China's socioeconomic reform process.
In 2001 China had 662 cities, up from 193 cities on the
eve of China's reform in the early 1980s. Although China's
urbanization level remains relatively low by international
standards, many scholars believe the fast economic growth in
post-reform China is intimately linked with the accelerated pace of
urbanization.2 The central government has a strong desire to reduce
the disparity between urban and rural areas and bring these two
sectors into closer cooperation, and to develop "small and medium-
size" counties and cities as an alternative to further concentration
of people in the already crowded "large" cities.3 Most of the newly
recognized cities during the period were upgraded from "small and
medium-size" counties.
The introduction of the free market system and open door
policy, promoted primarily by Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), in
China since 1978 have brought an urbanization surge spreading
through the country, mostly starting from small and middle-sized
rural areas (cities) in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) area, instead
of being driven mainly by the growth of large cities. According
to Hackenberg, city form and its development pattern, within a
socialist country, "depart[s] substantially from the past experience
of industrialized countries or of stereotypical models of urban
industrialization" (1980:391).4 The city of Shenzhen, established
in 1979 within the PRD is one of the most important cities to
initiate this ongoing phenomenon, which Deng had acknowledged
as playing a key role in helping China link to the modern world
economy.
The nature of China's reform is indicated in the Chinese
leaders' description of it as "groping for stones to cross the river"
or "to walk a step and watch a step." It allows national and local
leaders to adjust constantly and adapt to dynamic circumstances.
The economic development within this evolving hybrid
model-the interacting of planning mechanisms and emerging
market forces-favors a city's spatial shape genre having greater
geographical flexibility and adaptability.' It thus appears that the
city's form, landscape, and architecture run parallel with Shenzhen
even China's continuing economic transformation.
The active introduction of a market mechanism within
Chinese socialist territory since 1978, in the midst of a globalization
movement, has had profound impact on the form development
of Shenzhen. To discuss the city's form, I will (1) introduce the
historical background of traditional Chinese city forms and the city
and its natural topography, (2) examine various urban planning
schemes and infrastructure growth patterns, and inspect urban
architecture, (3) analyze some economic reforms and their impact
on the urban form development, and (4) design proposals for the
city's future growth.
In this thesis, I have sought to apply interdisciplinary
perspectives to document, explain, and analyze the development
of the contested city form of Shenzhen as a case study. I use Zone,
City, and RegionalNexus as three key terms to characterize the three
phases of Shenzhen's physical form nature and the corresponding
political roles, urban planning strategy, and economic goals of the
city, which are actively interacting and transforming. As the role of
the city in regional development, and the positions it holds in the
settlement hierarchy change, the logic of the spatial organization
for population and economic activities also changes.
The paper hypothesizes that the city form evolution
of Shenzhen is a morphological gaming response to the rapid
globalization, political ideological shift, local economic, and
natural resource positioning and redistributing after the 1980s,
experimenting with varied urban planning praxis. Therefore, its
form development is contested in the region to maintain the city's
potential symbiotic economic predominant posture; however, in
some ways that comes at the expense of urban identity, architectural
quality, culture, and environment. As a case study, Shenzhen
demonstrates an effective and timely adjustable city form making
a city sustainable, restructuring its expanding economy, and
accommodating rapid population growth. This research project
seeks not only to identify the critical driving forces behind the
dynamic pattern of the development of the physical city form and
urban architecture, but also, more importantly, to investigate the
potential feasible urban growth methods for transforming existing
urban spaces toward "post-instrumental" sustainable places. The
city's successes, mistakes, and possible methods identified could
help other growing small and middle-sized cities benefit from the
lessons of the Shenzhen experience.
A. Traditional Chinese City Forms
About six or seven thousand years ago, evidence from the
archeological ruins of Banpo and Jiangzhai villages shows that
the human settlement layout in China reflected the basic organic
relationship between "people-place-work" in matriarchal society.
People selected flat areas for villages beside rivers. Villages
contained three parts: the residential section, the area for pottery
making, and the burial ground. The houses were divided into five
groups, with each group facing the central plaza-an open space
serving for public activities. Later, when different classes and cities
emerged in Chinese history, the above role of open space was
relatively neglected.6 Outside the residential area, a trench was dug
for defense.
In China's imperial dynastic system, a city functioned as
a capital and local administrative control center. Unlike Western
Europe and Japan, where the city was the center of change, urban
Figure 1. The ideal imperial capital derived from the Zhou Li
Source: Shiling Zheng and Alan Balfour, Shanghai (UK: Wiley-Acad-
emy, 2002), p.13 .
settlements in China were centers of dominant political authority
and orthodoxy, and they were normally able to resist change.7 The
ideal type of the Chinese city usually had cardinal orientation,
cardinal axiality, and a square perimeter delimited by a massive
wall. "Kao Gong Ji" (The Artificer's Record) in the "Zhou Li"
(Figure 1), written in the early period of the Zhanguo (Warring
States), is generally recognized by researchers as the locus
classicus for the ideal layout of Chinese capitals. One section of
the book dealt with the ordering of urban space:
The general layout should be a square of nine
Li (1 Li = 415 meters), with three city gates
on each side and nine longitudinal and nine
latitudinal streets. The width of the roads
should be nine times (18 meters) that of a cart
gauge. The king's palace should be placed at
the center of the city, with the ancestral temple
on the left and the field altar on the right.'
The strict and hierarchical regular planning system also stipulated
different scales for the city of the emperor, the cities of the feudal
lords, and those of the princes, regarding the area of the city,
the height of the city wall, and the width of the roads. The ideal
city layout reflected basic modes of traditional Chinese cosmic
symbolism and the influence of Confucianism on organizing the
government and society of the time. "Heaven was the supreme
ruler, and the Sun, Moon, mountains, rivers and other natural
phenomena all had their attendant deities."9 The Emperor (the son
of Heaven) had the "mandate of Heaven" to rule supreme on Earth.
The "ideal" planning conception and system in "Kao Gong Ji"
exerted a profound and far-reaching influence on ancient Chinese
city planning. Its cardinal orientation principles, which expressed
closely related attitudes toward the cosmological ordering of space,
were a prototypical layout for Chinese cities for all successive
dynasties until the last (Qing) Dynasty, although a few innovations
were made in the course of city formation. The main processional
axis running from south to north, "the celestial meridian writ
small," along which were ranged the most important official and
ritual buildings, was of much greater significance than any avenue
running from east to west.
Early concepts of regional and city planning were also
described in "Guan Zi" and "Shang Jun Shu" ("Lord Shang's
Book"). Both books oriented city development to serve agriculture
and warfare. Their premise gave a dialectical explanation of the
relationship between cities and regions for determining their
corresponding sizes and population structure. "Lord Shang's
Book," for example, held that there should be a certain proportion
between the areas of mountains and rivers, cities and towns,
and roads and farms in a given region. A tenth should be forests
and hills, ponds and lakes, rivers and streams, villages and
roads, respectively, in a given area. According to "Guan Zi," the
agricultural and nonagricultural population should be in proper
proportion; the area of a city should be in a particular proportion
to that of the farmland; it was necessary to have cities with walls
and moats to protect the territory of the state, soldiers to defend the
cities, and a sufficient supply of grain to feed the people who were
the source of the soldiers;" and a city should be built according to
local circumstances, to save manpower and materials. The book
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Figure 2. Chang'an, Capital of Han Dynasty (Xi'an, Shanxi, Western
Han, 206 B.C. - 23 A.D.)
Source: Wu, Liangyong, A Brief History of Ancient Chinese City Plan-
ning (Kassel: Urbs et Regio, 1985), p. 17.
also proposed that the "officials be settled near the market places,
non-officials and farmers near the city gates, and workers and
businessmen near the market places."
Liu Bang, the first emperor of the Han Dynasty (202 BC
- AD 220), unified the whole country, and decided to found the
capital-Chang'an-in Guanzhong Plain (Figure 2), mainly for
easier military defense. It was also the starting point of the "Silk
Road" in the East. To fit the topography and existing conditions, the
city presented an irregular shape, but with twelve regular city gates,
eight longitudinal main four-lane tree-lined streets, nine horizontal
large tree-lined streets, and nine classified and supervised markets.
The central and the southern sections of the city were entirely
occupied by the palace districts built on rammed earth. The
Weiyang Palace and Changle Palace were situated on the high land
of the Dragon's Head Plain, providing a commanding view of the
city and keeping it under observation and control. However, these
palaces were interspersed among the residential blocks. There were
160 blocks for the common people to live in, within which the
walled houses and courtyards were connected and arranged closely
side-by-side.
In the late Eastern Han Dynasty, the king of Wei, Cao
Cao, ordered the building of Ye city, which was rectangular in
shape. Compared with former capital cities, Ye city planning
made great advances. We begin to see logical functional districts
and systematic street layout. A horizontal main street passed
through the city and divided it into two. The center of the northern
portion concentrated together the governmental office quarters
and palaces: an improvement upon Chang'an, the city of the Han.
The living area for the nobles was to its east. South of the main
I
street were four residential quarters and three market places. Three
north-south arterial roads met the main horizontal street at three
places with a closed square in front, respectively forming the focal
points of the city, which could be considered as the prototype
of Tian'anmen Square, built in the Ming and Qing Dynasties
in Beijing (Figure 7). "Chang'an of the Tang Dynasty was in a
sense inherited and developed from Ye. So, it could be said that
the planning of Ye is a milestone in the history of early Chinese
capital city development."" Another city's layout that influenced
Tang Chang'an was the Luoyang of Northern Wei. With a certain
degree of expansion of the flourishing commodity economy, the
governmental office quarters were clustered along both sides
of the north-south central axis extended from the southern city
gate directly to the central palaces. Three markets, each with its
own specialty, were located in the eastern, western, and southern
portions of the city.
The landmark city Chang'an (Figure 3 and 4), reconstructed
by the order of Emperor Wen (Yang Jian), was the political and
cultural center of the Sui and Tang Dynasties. Yuwen Kai, the chief
director of the construction, and other architects visited Luoyang
and Ye cities on several occasions to investigate and learn positive
design aspects of the cities. Chang'an city was placed on the higher
piece of land named "Dragon's Head Plain," flanked by two rivers.
The layout was strictly regular and grand (9,721 x 8,651 sq m),
with 17 gates. Zoning had become less ambiguous. The imperial
palace and most forbidden gardens were located in the middle of
the northern city. The "Fangli" (block unit) was regularly arranged.
There were fourteen straight streets running from north to south
and eleven running from east to west, forming a systematized
regular grid, while 155-meter-wide Zhuquemen Dajie provided
a north-south axis for the city. Walled street blocks of various
sizes were relatively independent small cities within the big city.
However, every block had its gate closed at night, even including
Eastern and Western Markets. Chang'an city of the Tang Dynasty
boasted a population of about one million; each block was able to
accommodate 10,000 people. Industrial and commercial enterprises
appeared along the major communication routes in two specifically
zoned market areas and near the city gates and on the two sides of
the central ceremonial axis. Buddhist and Taoist temples advocated
by the government spread throughout the city and could be seen
everywhere, with markets around them; these were also venues for
public activities and cultural exchange. Nonetheless, throughout
300 years of construction and administration, the north portion
remained unused and sparsely populated.
After the fall of Tang and more than fifty years of fighting
among breakaway regimes, in 960 AD Zhao Kuangyin established
the Song Dynasty. Song was a dynasty whose emperors did not
impose strict rules and thought on people. China enjoyed a period
of economic growth coupled with great artistic and intellectual
achievement but accompanied by unsound military strategies and
ideologies. The capital was shifted to Bianliang (modern Kaifeng)
(Figure 5) in Henan, a transportation intersection between North
Figure 4. Chang'an city form
Figure 3. Perspective view of Chang'an City, Tang Dynasty
Source: Gideon S. Golany, Urban Design Ethics in Ancient China (Lew-
iston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 165.
and South China, and the Grand Canal and the Yellow River.
The Grand Canal's route winds through some of China's most
fertile and heavily populated country, making it a vital artery for
moving food and goods. But even more importantly, in a country
dominated by west-east-flowing rivers, the Canal provides a
north-south connection between several river systems. Bianliang,
located on the central section of the Canal, was the hub of traffic
where goods (financial resources for the empire) converged from
all directions through the canal, although the city was low and flat
and hence difficult to defend. 2 Thus, macro transportation factors
facilitating economic development were becoming a important
consideration. Bianliang expanded three times on a small old city,
whose walls and moats were thus threefold. Although its planning
adhered to the traditional Chinese city philosophy, its overall shape
was not rigidly square, nor were streets and lands unified and
precise. "Licheng" (inner city) in the middle was rectangular in
shape. North of it was the Palace City. The outer city was built for
defense against aggression, with thirteen city gates and seven water
gates. Due to commercial development, the Tang's "street-and
block" system was broken up and flourishing business streets were
emerging, as can be clearly seen in Zhang Zeduan's "Qingming
Shanghe Tu" (Riverside Scene during Qingming Festival, 1125
A.D.) (Figure 6). Four rivers flowed through the city, linked by
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Figure 5. Kaifeng, the Eastern Capital of the Northern Song Dynasty
Source: Wu, Liangyong, A Brief History of Ancient Chinese City Plan-
ning (Kassel: Urbs et Regio, 1985), p. 46.
the city moats and bounding several thriving business districts.
We can see the breakdown of the official marketing organization,
the replacement of the enclosed marketplace with a much freer
street plan." A total of thirty-three bridges enhanced the beauty
Figure 6. Lite along the River on the Eve of the Qmng Ming Festival,
Zhang Zeduan, I1th century.
Source: Beijing Museum.
of the city. The development of urban commodity economy under
the Chinese feudal form of society resulted in an inner and outer
city urban structure that marked a turning point, after which cities
largely exhibited similar features.
The Ming Emperor Yong Le decided to shift the capital
from Nanjing to Beijing in 1419 A.D. Beijing city (Figure 7)
comprehensively adopted the use of a central north-south axis
(7.9 km long). Most of the main streets ran from north to south.
The residential blocks were in accordance with the "Sihe yuan"
courtyard pattern. The "Forbidden City" of Beijing was built on
the site of the old Yuan Dynasty city. The court at the front and the
living quarters at the back composed the palace buildings, with only
one gate on each side of the Imperial City. Business districts were
located outside the Front City Gate. It also served as the capital of
the laster empire of China, Qing Dynasty.
The imperative of administrative control, from the national
0 1 2 311 (1 11=576 m)
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Figure 7. Beijing, Capital of Ming Dynasty
Source: Liangyong Wu, A Brief History ofAncient Chinese City
Planning (Kassel: Urbs et Regio,1985), p. 69.
capital through provincial and prefectural capitals, down to the
xian (county) capital, established the framework for China's urban
system. By the late Tang and into the Song Dynasty, cities were
growing additionally as commercial and trading centers, with
flourishing commerce based on agriculture and transport advances. 14
The large city was a multifunctional place of administration and
commerce, and also of culture, education, and industrial production,
which was functionally linked in mutually beneficial ways with its
surrounding hinterlands. Local administrative centers were also
generally political, economic, military, and cultural hubs and such
cities often developed gradually and took on irregular shapes based
on the various topographic, climatic, and social conditions.
B. Treaty Ports
In the 19* century and at the turn of the 2 0 th century, certain
cities along China's eastern coastline, such as Shanghai, Qindao,
Tianjin (Figure 10), Dalian, and Guangzhou, came to be called
treaty ports after several opium wars with Britain and other western
countries. "The treaty laws gave special privileges to foreigners,
permitting them to live and do business in these cities without
subjecting them to Chinese laws and regulations."" Water transport
reoriented the entire urban system toward the coastal locations.
Coastal locations connected to world shipping routes and the
emerging international marketing network. The randomly planned
and individual owner-tailored treaty ports played an important
long-term role in the city evolution of the country, although the
foreign intrusion had limited ability to penetrate the vast interior
and traditional Chinese society and culture. The treaty port was the
NFigure 8. Old Shanghai in 1930s.
Source: Esherick W., editor, Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and
National Identity, 1900-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2000), p. 194.
model for rapid urban growth and development between 1842 and
1949. Large labor pools, local materials, and markets induced an
inflow of foreign and domestic capital to develop manufacturing
industries in these ports whose functions were commercial and
industrial. Shanghai (Figure 8 and 9), commanding the estuary
to the Changjiang River (Yangzi River), became the "flourishing"
archetype and symbol of the foreign-dominated city. It became the
largest city by 1910, with a population of more than one million. In
the meantime, railroad construction linked the major nodes of the
various urban systems in a vast and integrated urban and regional
) apanese
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Figure 10. Tianjin in 1917. Foreign settlements occupy both banks of the
Hai River southeast of the former wall city. After 1902, the Qing built a
new commercial and administrative area to the north east of the old city.
Source: Esherick W., editor, Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and
National Identity, 1900-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2000), p. 35.
network. The two thousand years of the unified imperial urban
form prototype had completely broken down.
C. Cities and Urban Planning in the Maoist Era
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Figure 11. The master plan of Lanzhou for the First Five Year Plan of
1954
Source: Anthony Gar-On Yeh and Fulong Wu, "The Transformation of
the Urban Planning System in China from a Centrally-Planned to Transi-
tional Economy in Progress," in Planning (UK: Pergamon), Vol. 51, Part
3, 1999, p. 183.
In 1949, China was a poor and backward country, and the
modern industrial sector was small and mostly foreign-owned.
The new leaders had their own views of the role of cities. Mao
Zedong suggested "the center of gravity of the Party's work has
been shifted from the village to the city. Only when production
in the cities is restored and developed, and when consumer-cities
are transformed into producer-cities, may the people's political
power be consolidated." 16 Cities were categorized as "producer
cities" and "consumer cities": cities with dominant manufacturing
production were deemed as "producer" and productive, whereas
cities specialized in commercial, retailing, financial, and other
non-manufacturing activities were categorized as "consumer,"
associated with the capitalist way of life.17 "Producer cities" were
preferred. The transformation of the city from a "consumptive"
to "productive" entity began. In Mao's view, industrial cities
became the focal points of government, and their purposes derived
from the Marxist principle of the eradication of the three major
contradictions: the contradictions between town and country,
between agriculture and industry, and between mental and manual
labor.18 Land, an essential component of the property industry,
was nationalized and was not tradable. The state played a decisive
role in the process of urbanization through central planning. Such
planning affected the growth, shape, nature, and performance of
(new) cities, and the rise and fall of the urban population. With
central planning, urban development tasks rested completely in the
state, to facilitate the paramount goal of industrialization without
market mechanisms' intervention.
Chinese urban planning methods and spatial development
Figure 12. Lanzhou city form in the 1950s
had been almost entirely determined by national development
policy and central economic objectives. Before 1978 urban
planning practice was limited to functionally grouping certain
standard types of work-unit compounds in certain areas of the
city. This created a spatially and visually homogenous and less
differentiated cityscape. The city region's spatial pattern has
allowed achieving the goals of urban self-sufficiency and the
integration of industrial and agricultural activities through the flow
of resources within the city region. As David Buck has pointed out,
"the needs of production units took precedence over considerations
for the environment, workers' amenities or the overall plan of a
community."19 Additionally, redevelopment of the old city core, the
control of the growth of the municipality, the promotion of small
towns within the city region, and the integration of these planning
elements were the principal goals of city planners.
A city's layout (Figure 11 and 12) was simply configured to
functionally support urban productive units and provide its workers
with necessary social services. Many indistinguishable districts of
a city ideally were to be relatively self-sufficient, offering their
residents all or most general functions such as housing, employment,
and the provision of subsistence goods and services. Controlled
and walled work-units (danwei) embedded inside different districts
provided a wide range of services for their employees: a miniature
city within its wall. Industry and other functions of all scales
were mixed together in close spatial proximity. Inside each work-
unit production facilities and residential facilities were usually
accommodated in separate structures; orderly rows of residential
structures commonly consisted of "modernist" rectangular 3
to 5-story brick or precast cement buildings.20 Common areas
between the buildings served as bicycle parking lots, playgrounds,
recreation places, and green areas. Commercial service within
collective and communal enterprises reduced the functional role of
small business districts. The transformation of the oldest districts
of the cities was too costly or impractical to be undertaken. The
notion of "city center" was different from that in capitalist cities.
Commercial nodes were always either separate from the political
center (typically a large public square used occasionally for political
gatherings), or adjacent to the political center, to avoid "tarnishing"
the lofty ideological symbolism.
In its first decade of socialist development (1949-1957),
China followed the model of the Soviet Union and focused on a
high rate of investment in heavy industry and producer goods to
achieve the goal of industrialization and economic transformation.
Soviet and Eastern European theories dominated both planning and
practice. In some large cities, planners concentrated their efforts on
urban rehabilitation and community facilities that had experienced
the greatest damage during the civil war. Large numbers of slums
and squatter areas of the large cities were targeted for improvement
by the construction of public squares and parks, and as locations
for future construction. Urban housing was created to strengthen
the confidence of the people in the government, in additional to
numerous public buildings and cultural centers. For example, the
new plan for the Tian'anmen Square complex was functionally
and symbolically intended to exhibit a demand for respect and
solemnity that unmistakably reflects the Soviet influence on
Chinese city planning.
China enthusiastically pursued industrialization: it was a
strategic decision to develop heavy industries, the responsibility
of various national government ministries only, as the national
backbone in major industrial bases and key cities. Large-scale
suburban development, generally under the name of "new
villages," was carried out around these cities." The suburban
expansion of these cities, including new villages for workers that
sprang up around these cities, had been so extensive that, from
the beginning of 1957, planners considered the development of
satellite towns around large cities, chosen on the basis of the
requirements of new industries and national defense criteria, as
one of the salient solutions to excessive urban growth. The concept
of community planning was based on a hierarchical system of the
residential classes. The residential spatial patterns (Figure 13) of the
introduced to China through the Soviet experts, but urban housing
development and its related community facilities were integrated
together in the Chinese context and under the administration of the
municipalities.22 However, the capital and technological investment
in industry far exceeded that in housing and urban utilities and
aggravated the divide between city and countryside. Infrastructure
and urban services were also ignored and the provision of goods for
the daily consumption of city dwellers was somewhat insufficient.
During the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), the Soviet
heavy industrial model was abandoned, and urban development
gave equal weight to agricultural and industrial development and
the rural commune system began to be established. As a result, the
policy eliminated resources for urban development. The Soviet
Union withdrew all aid in 1960; in this hiatus, planners themselves
were reconsidering the direction, concepts, and style of urban
planning and development.
The Cultural Revolution period (1966-76) after the Great
Leap Forward was characterized by an emphasis on further reducing
the differences between city and countryside and between industry
and agriculture, mainly through self-reliance using intermediate
technology and indigenous methods for community planning and
construction." One way to reduce the differences between urban
and rural areas was to partially urbanize the countryside. Modern
technology was gradually introduced into traditional rural society.
A number of rural communes with industrial establishments were
system were similar to those of the British neighborhood concept planned. The state provided large-scale investment to develop
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Figure 14. Plans of Hongqi
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Source: Yin-Wang R. Kwok,
"Trends of Urban Planning
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Figure 13. Residential spatial pattern
Source: Yin-Wang R. Kwok, "Trends
of Urban Planning and Development in
China," in Urban Development in Modem
China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981),
editors, Laurence J. C. Ma and Edward W.
Hanten, p. 156.
irrigation and drainage facilities and produce chemical fertilizers.
For instance, the Hongqi People's Commune, approximately
23 km northwest of Beijing, was composed of 50 to 60 villages
with the aim of developing regional industry for a more balanced
agricultural and industrial growth and organizing a variety of
enterprises to absorb the surplus labor force. Zhaojiatun (Figure
14) was the central residential point with 15,000 to 20,000 people.
The plan of Zhaojiatun was formal yet fluid, with the changes of
axes of the road network creating interesting spaces and vistas
which broke the otherwise monotonous grid pattern of streets. 4
Petroleum-based Daqing (Figure 15), built in the bleak
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environment of Heilongjiang, was an example in this period
when enormous efforts were made in search of natural resource
development. Workers extensively participated in decision making
and plan implementation. Daqing was a new settlement and its
model was to deal with (1) the reality of constrained resources and
minimum state investment; (2) the national defense requirement
of decentralization and self-sufficiency of settlements; (3) mass
participation in community development and control.
The plan of Daqing followed a three-tier hierarchical
system. Habitation points (300 households each) were separated
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Figure 15. Settlement or-
ganization of Daqing
Source: Yin-Wang R.
Kwok, "Trends of Urban
Planning and Develop-
ment in China," in Urban
Development in Modern
China (Boulder: West-
view Press, 1981), Lau-
rence J. C. Ma and Ed-
ward W. Hanten,editors,
p. 179.
from each other by a distance of about two km. The only
community facilities provided were related to education and health.
The Living Base was the second level. Each had a population of
3,750 to 6,250, containing three to five Habitation Points and a
Central Population Point. The Living Base offered a higher level
of community services, including educational, health facilities, and
administration, and was situated near fields to facilitate farming.
Thus, other members of an oil worker's family could become
involved in farming, animal husbandry, and community services.
The entire city region of Daqing comprised about 30 Living
Bases with a total population of 150,000 to 200,000. This type
of scattered layout pattern was adopted partly on the basis of the
work requirements for oil production. Daqing became a pivotal
showpiece example of the synthesis of urban and rural development
in later years, which resulted in many urban centers swallowing
vast rural areas to increase their population to city-status level in
the 1950s and 1960s.
The ancient Chinese city form was a synthetic embodiment
of cultural beliefs and political power relations; the "producer"
cities of the 1950s had a linear functional layout intended only
for the heavy industries promoted by the central economic plan.
The designation of comprehensive economic goals for Shenzhen
begins a new trajectory for city form evolution. Its earlier form
was a continuation idea of the 1950s' linear functional layout.
Within 23 compressed years, Shenzhen has gone from fishing town
to industrialized city to a high-tech and information node of the
region. Its form has gradually changed to adapt to the changing
market system and ideology, as we will see, some traditional
planning aspects have been adopted, albeit indistinctly, into the
city's design.
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II. Start-Up (1978-1979)
A. Power Transition
In October 1976, less than a month after Mao's death, Jiang
Qing and her three principal associates-denounced as "the Gang
of Four"-were arrested with the assistance of two senior Political
Bureau members, Minister of National Defense Ye Jianying and
Wang Dongxing, commander of the CCP's elite bodyguard.' In
July 1977 the Central Committee exonerated Deng Xiaoping of
responsibility for the Tiananmen Square Incident (the April 5th
Movement) in 1976 and he resumed all the positions from which he
had been removed in 1976. During August 12 to 18, 1977, with the
incarceration of the Gang, the Eleventh National Party Congress
officially proclaimed the end of the Cultural Revolution.
To eradicate "leftist" influence from the Cultural Revolution
and to create a secure national environment for initiating political,
economic, and social reforms, Deng took three main steps. First, to
establish a new balance of power that could promote and carry out
a series of reform plans, Deng reinstated his former associates and
personnel and others sympathetic to his reform plans; many were
those purged not only during the Cultural Revolution, but as early
as the mid-1950s. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National
Party Congress Central Committee in December 1978, the party
declared that the center of gravity had shifted to promoting "the
Four Modernizations."2 In other words, the accomplishment of
economic success would be the measure of policies and individual
leadership: economics, instead of politics, was in command.
Second, to enhance mutual understanding and promote the
development of relations, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (Figure 16
and 17) paid an official visit to the United States at the invitation
of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter from 29 January to 4 February
1979. This was the first visit by a Chinese leader to the U.S. since
the founding of China in 1949 and was welcomed by the U.S.
government.3 In early 1977 President Carter had sent his Secretary
of State, Cyrus Vance, and his White House National Security
Assistant, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to visit China in August 1977
and May 1978, respectively, to hold talks on the normalization
of Sino-U.S. relations. After intensive negotiations, the two sides
reached three agreements and issued the Joint Communique on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the two countries
on the evening of 16 December 1978. One of Deng's motives was
that new relations with the West would provide opportunities to
expand trade and acquire technology.4
Third, the quick Sino-U.S. normalization process not only
consolidated his power and inaugurated nationwide economic
change, but freed Deng to launch an attack on Vietnam to punish
Hanoi for its invasion of Cambodia; it served also "to clear
the American flank before addressing the issue of Vietnamese
imperialism."5 In November 1978 Vietnam had signed a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the former Soviet Union and had
begun expelling Vietnamese of Chinese descent. A month later the
Figure 17. Deng Xiaoping
and Jimmy Carter
Source: http:l/
history. sandiego.edu/gen/
USPics2/78520.jpg
Figure 16. Deng Xiaoping gave a speech at the UN in 1979.
Source: http://museums.cnd.org/China89/images/figures/dengl.jpg
Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and harassed the China-Vietnam
border. While Deng was in Washington, he told President Jimmy
Carter in a private meeting what China was about to do and why.
Not only did Beijing feel Vietnam was acting ungratefully after
all the assistance it had received during its Vietnam-U.S war,
but also Deng saw it as a calculated move by Moscow to use its
allies to encircle China from the south, which was a potential
threat to national security.6 The war lasted 17 days, starting early
in the morning of February 17, 1979. Although the war made a
clear political point-that the Chinese could take Hanoi, if they
wished 7-the loss of soldiers' lives was tremendous: some 20,000
Chinese soldiers died, by China's own estimate. The degree of
ferocity and the rate of casualties on the other side, as described
by Vietnamese, were enormously greater than anything they had
experienced with the U.S.
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Figure 18. The location of Shenzhen is in
the southern part of Guangdong Province,
adjacent to the New Territories of Hong
Kong.
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Figure 19. Emerging subregional economic linkage
and growth triangles in Pacific Asia
Sources: Yue-man Yeung, Globalization and
Networked Societies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2000), p. 47.
The war also showed China, as well as Deng, how outdated
its technology was and how weak was its economic system. Both
had been hampered by the ten-year Cultural Revolution and the
30 years of isolation from Western countries. China lagged behind
not only the industrialized nations of the West but also the new
industrial powers of Asia: Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and
Chinese Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, there were no universal
Figure 20. Pearl River Delta
theories and ready models for China's modernization process.'
Deng's reform plans and "Open Door Policy" for China's
social and economic systems were highly risky, both politically and
practically, especially so few years after the Cultural Revolution,
because there was no model to follow as to how to evaluate the
market mechanism in a socialist country with a population (in
1982) of one billion. "Once and for all," abandoning previous
economic structures and adopting market mechanisms, would cause
Figure 21. Xin'an County Map, 1909
Source: Guangdong Yu Di Quang Tu [Guangdong Map], The Great
Empire of Qing, 1909 (Xuan Tong), Yenching Library, Harvard
University.
imminent macro-economic, and even social, chaos. This latent risk
made Deng opt for an incremental process of reform: rather than
subverting the remaining socialist framework through "shock
therapy," reform strategies would incorporate capitalist elements
into the existing socialist economic system. The reform program
was to make current institutions work better by considerably
increasing the role of the market in the system and by reducing-
Figure 22. The old Shenzhen Town, 1982
Source: Haitian Publishing House, Chronicle of Shenzhen (Shenzhen:
Haitian Publishing House, 2000), p. 306.
not eliminating-government planning and direct control. Despite
ongoing criticism and debate, a decision to undertake a process
of gradual but fundamental reform of the economic system was
reached at the milestone Third Plenum of the Eleventh National
Party Congress's Central Committee in December 1978. New
capitalist and market-oriented measures and mechanisms would
first be introduced experimentally in a few localities, and then
would be popularized and disseminated nationally if they proved
successful: "crossing the river while feeling the stones."9
B. Fulcrum
During 1949-60, China accepted assistance only from the
Soviet Union for instituting a centrally planned economy and
establishing the industrial base and infrastructure of the country.
The two countries' relationship broke down in 1960 and the Soviet
Union immediately withdrew all loans and specialist and technical
personnel. From 1967 to 1977, China was virtually isolated from
the rest of the world during the Cultural Revolution. It then seemed
that China's modernization could only be achieved through co-
operation with developed countries and her Southeast Asian
neighbors (Figure 18 and 19), such as Singapore, Hong Kong,
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
In the spring of 1977, the leader of the National Financial
Department, Zhang Jinfu, made a working visit to Shenzhen. He
found that many peasants were giving up their farming lands and
escaping to Hong Kong. Private trading along the border between
Shenzhen and Hong Kong was abnormally active, considering the
state-owned economic system, and was benefiting some peasants.
Research in April 1978 by the National Planning Committee and
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT)
of the State Council on the economics of Hong Kong and Macao
suggested establishment of "special export zones (bases)" in
Shenzhen and Zhuhai (Figure 20). On January 31s, 1979, the
Central Government authorized the China Merchants Steam
Navigation Co. Ltd (Hong Kong) to rent the western peninsula (9
sq km) of Shenzhen, Shekou, to create a separate industrial zone.
The geographic location of Shenzhen (Figure 20), nestled
in the south coastal area of Guangdong Province and separated by
Shenzhen River from Hong Kong, attracted Deng's attention. The
city is only 50 km from the center of Hong Kong.10 Additionally,
since the early fifteenth century onwards, significant numbers of
people from Guangdong had emigrated to various parts of the world,
most of them to Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. By the 1980s,
thirty-five-thousand overseas Chinese were from the Shenzhen
area." Cantonese (Guangdong Hua) is widely spoken in the
Shenzhen area and Hong Kong. Therefore, besides its attraciveness
to foreign investors, the city would have particular appeal, through
kinship and culture, to overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. Based
on the rapidly changing situation and extensive consideration,
in spring 1978 at the Central-South Sea Palace in Beijing, Deng
said, "Make Shenzhen a special zone!" He needed a fulcrum to
upend the rigid planning system, initiate an efficient system that
could thoroughly liberate productive forces, and integrate China
into the international trading system. He sensed that the coastal
region of southern China could become an economically active
fulcrum for the rest of China if assisted with special policies and
measures to "strive for the utilization of international capital and
advanced technology to assist [China's] economic development.12
In late 1978, the emerging idea of "special zone," different from the
mainstream to undertake certain economic development tasks, was
becoming popular among some open-minded party leaders.
In 1979 the county was renamed from Bao'an County to
Shenzhen (Figure 21 and 22) and upgraded to municipal status
under the direct rule of the Guangdong provincial government."
This status meant it could have greater autonomy in approving
foreign investments. At the end of 1978, the Shenzhen SEZ
had initially been envisaged almost as a replica of the Export
Processing Zones of other countries in East and Southeast Asia,
and was regarded as a "special export base" in the report by Wu
Nansheng, one of the Guangdong administrative committee. It
was considered likely that foreign capital would use it as such,
and thus smaller and more entrepreneurial capital could be
attracted into joint ventures (JVs) with large state firms, with a
view to reorganization and technology transfer. Foreign capital
could thereby be contained within the central plan. To cover the
city's comprehensive role, the term was later changed to "special
economic zone" at a working meeting for Guangdong and Fujian
provinces that was headed by Vice Prime Minister Gu Mu in March
1980. Its official size and status were subsequently addressed in the
Regulation on the Special Economic Zone of Guangdong Province
in August 1980 that was formally approved and promulgated by
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The
committee decided to designate southern areas in Shenzhen City
for the establishment of a Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
covering primary, secondary, and tertiary activities. The city was
planned to be under separate administrative and political tutelages
from the very beginning to ensure its success and to minimize red
tape. Although the city was under the direct rule of the Guangdong
provincial government, a city office was created under the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) of the State
Council for keeping constant contact with other authorities in
the central government and their subordinates. This arrangement
provided a certain political independence to the city.
C. Coastal Regions
Due to the importance of national security and spatial and
social equity considerations (as early as 1956, Mao had identified
the contrast between the coastal provinces and the sparsely
populated central and interior western provinces as one of the ten
major contradictions of China), much investment was concentrated
on interior "producer" cities, such as Lanzhou, Wuhan, Xi'an,
and Chongqing. A new pattern of industrial locations with centers
removed from the coastal areas was created. Nevertheless, the
social-economic reform in China after Mao's era has started from
coastal cities such as Shenzhen in Guangdong Province.
Beginning in 1979, the reform attempted to loosen the
domination of governmental structures over production decisions,
and the barriers to rural-urban migration were significantly reduced
as a part of reform. The Chinese now believed that a better spread
of the urban population among medium-sized and small cities was
essential, and therefore the further growth of the large cities (multi-
million populations) must be strictly limited. Development strategy
in China shifted to the growth of nonagricultural activities in the
Figure 23. LANDSAT image of the PRD and Shenzhen SEZ, taken on
February 10, 1977
Source:http://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/vis/aOOOOOO/aOO2900/aOO2911/
index.html
countryside, and small towns were "the lowest level of a hierarchy
of central places that culminates in the great economic centers of
China's macroregions," while urban areas are for the central-place
hierarchy of economic, political, and administrative characteristics
of settlements." Over a long historical period, rural towns,
identified as the base of the system, were the centers of peasant
marketing. Rural residents now have assumed new economic roles
and are deeply involved in the process of industrialization, even
urbanization, which is typically exclusively urban in other national
contexts. "There has not been significant industrial growth in the
major urban centers as the dominant paradigms might predict
and as was Chinese practice in the 1950s."" It seems that the
socioeconomic reforms from the central government have been
intended to shift the focus back to rural areas. This time Chinese
industrialization and even urbanization have been partially initially
led by rural town and countryside development.
In the coastal regions, Guangdong and Fujian were
specially granted a high degree of provincial autonomy and the
provincial governments were authorized to solicit investment funds
from abroad, including overseas Chinese. Three out of four Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) were located in the Pearl River Delta
region (PRD) (Figure 23), Guangdong province, as part of the effort
to encourage technological and financial transfer from abroad. In
1985, the PRD region was designated an "Open Economic Region"
including four cities and 12 counties, covering an area of 22,700 sq
km. In December 1987, the Open Zone was expanded to include
seven cities and 21 counties, constituting an area of 45,005 sq
km,16 with existing population in the region of more than twenty
million, excluding that of Hong Kong and Macao. The reform
initiated significant economic and administrative changes that also
consequently triggered the city landscape change and the start of
regional urbanization. The rural economy of the PRD region has
developed beyond its traditional definition.
D. Edge County
Shenzhen SEZ was a rural area located in the PRD. Deng's
overall plan extending tested local market mechanisms to other
regions designated Shenzhen as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
serving as an experimentation and observation lab for China's entire
social and economic reform program, an important component of
the open policy. It was not until thirteen years after, in the 1990s, that
thorough economic and social reform were extended to Shanghai,
one of the most important industrial cities in eastern China.
Chinese control over the area of what is now known as the
Shenzhen Municipality dates back as early as the Qin Dynasty.
In 214 B.C., after the first emperor of China, Qing Shihuang,
shattered the Chu State, he sent General Wang Jian and his half-
million troops to Lingnan Territory to incorporate this area as
part of Qin. Consequently, the Central Culture for the first time
penetrated into the territory. It was not until the Ming Dynasty that
more people began to settle in this area, which was considered by
the Ming emperors to be strategically important enough to justify
fortification. Accordingly, a walled-garrison town was established
to secure the area. This part of China was given different
administrative names: Dongguang County in the Song Dynasty,
Xin'an County in the Ming Dynasty, and Bao'an County after the
Revolution of 1911. Nantou, a garrison town 20 km west from the
present Shenzhen SEZ downtown, was its county seat, the major
political and economic center of the county for the Ming and Qing
Dynasties. It served, among other functions, as the regional market
center for the south-central part of the area plus a substantial
portion of what is now the northern part of the New Territories of
Hong Kong. " The name "Shenzhen" did not appear in historical
documents until the 17th century when the Qing Dynasty (Figure21)
government built defense towers in Bao'an and named one of them
Shenzhen. In 1843, after the First Opium War, Hong Kong, an
island with a few fishing villages, was forcibly ceded to Britain by
the Treaty of Nanjing. Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutter's Island
were ceded to Britain by the First Convention of Beijing in 1898. In
1911, when the Kowloon Canton Railway was built between Hong
Kong and Guangzhou, a small station was set up in Shenzhen. 18
After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949,
the county's frontier position with the British colony, Hong Kong,
made it a restricted area. Bao'an remained a small town until 1979,
with a population of approximately 358,267 (1979). The population
density was about 158 persons/sq. km.'" It had a weak industrial
base, low agricultural and industrial production, and none of the
facilities of a modern city and remained very much a rural market
town serving the basic needs of the adjoining villages, despite its
proximity to Hong Kong.
The traditional Chinese culture usually gives high priority
to geographical centrality. Shenzhen is at the very edge of China.
For this small frontier town to be a priority in the central economic
planning perspective would normally seem unlikely, mainly due
to military and strategic considerations related to its potential
frontline position in the event of any seaborne invasion. However,
it was to become the experimental center in Deng's comprehensive
social reform movement.
E. Observation Lab
Deng's overall plan, extending tested local capital
mechanisms within a socialist framework to other regions,
designated Shenzhen as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) serving
as an experiment and "observation lab" for China's entire social
and economic reform program. In 1978 the State Council approved
this plan. Hong Kong, as a leading financial and manufacturing
center in Asia (Figure 24)), would be able to provide Shenzhen
with diverse information, banking, and other financial services
as well as management expertise that could spread to the rest of
China. It seems that it was never in the central planners' minds to
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Figure 24. Size comparison among Shenzhen SEZ, New York, and
Singapore
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utterly replace the centrally planned system with a capitalist market
economy, but only to make the existing political system more
efficient.2 0 The reforms started in a top-down manner aiming to
shake up the existing political regime and were meant to improve
productivity and enhance economic efficiency. The city would
assume the role of a gateway regarding opening to the world and
of a vanguard in restructuring China's economy2 -"a window of
China." Shenzhen, along with other SEZs, was expected to be an
engine to accelerate inland development. It was not until thirteen
years after, in the 1990s, that thorough economic and social reform
were extended to Shanghai, one of the most important industrial
cities in eastern China.
On April 5*, 1979, at the central government working
meeting in Beijing, Deng told the head of Guangdong Province,
Xi Zhongxun, that "the central government has no financial
assistance available for the special zones. The local government
itself must figure out methods of development..." While the
central government was providing the open door policy, localities
were expected to fund the construction of their own infrastructure.
Thus, attracting foreign capital to assist in the reconstruction of
the nation's economy, industry, and infrastructure was the pivot
of policy-making in all SEZs. The Guangdong government at that
time contributed very little to the central government's coffers and
what changed was that the central state loosened its constraints on
local economic development to permit "moving one step ahead."
Thus Shenzhen could be an experiment with negligible investment
from Beijing and with little risk to the national budget.
At the beginning, investments were mainly from domestic
sources. It was not until 1985, when the whole of the Pearl River
Delta (PRD) region was opened to foreign capital, that the rise of
the city became unstoppable.22 The overseas Chinese (Taiwan and
Hong Kong) dominated investment flows into the PRD region.
Shenzhen had developed as an enclave for testing out capitalist
ways of production. Since then, SEZs have become the barometers
of the openness of China.
The initial objectives of the city were briefly stated in 1985
by the first mayor, Liang Xiang:
important component of the open policy that is
being practiced in China. Shenzhen is not only one
of the important gateways with regard to opening
to the outside world, but is also a vanguard in
restructuring our economy. Over the years, in line
with the directive given by the Central Government
that "special things should be dealt with in special
ways, and new things in new ways; retain the same
stand while adopting completely new methods"
and that "reforms in the SEZ should be conducted
beyond the existing framework, it will inspire cadres
and people of the special zone to carry forward the
spirit of a "wasteland-reclaiming-buffalo" and to
keep making strenuous efforts to scale new heights,
conducting reforms and innovations, and charging
ahead in a pioneering spirit to turn Shenzhen as
soon as possible into a socialist special economic
zone with an export-oriented, multi-functional,
technically advanced, efficiently managed, and
highly civilized composite economy based mainly
on its industry with a rational production structure.
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F. Encapsulated Zone
Deng needed a fulcrum that had an advantageous
geographical location exposed to the flow of capital, technology,
management skills, materials, financial services, and information.
Additionally, foreign participation should be extensive: housing, real
estate, retail sectors, entertainment and infrastructure development,
as well as in industry. Its direct linkages with the local economies
The founding of special economic zones is an
Integrated Cross Section of Land Forms at Damao Mountain and Wutong Mountain
Figure 25. Shenzhen SEZ geographical land typology
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URBAN DEVELOPMENT
LAND TYPE (HA) (HA)
Flat land 7,260 (22.2%) 7,260
Built-up area 1,740 (5.3%) 1,740
Rolling/undulating 5,730 (17.5%) 2,000
Low-lying 1,460 (4.4%)
Hilly 15,910 (48.6%)
Water surface 650 (2.0%) -
Total 32,750 (100.0%) 11,000
Figure 26. The classification of land of Shenzhen SEZ
Source: Kwan-yiu Wong, and David K. Y Chu. editors, Modernization
in China: The Case of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985.)
in which it was set were not initially actively sought or anticipated.
Nonetheless, it was also critical that this testing territory be well
under control: its success would have significant implications
for the whole country, while its unlikely failure effects would be
containable.
Having witnessed the rapid growth of economic processing
zones in some Third World countries in the 1970s, the Central
Government announced the official establishment of Shenzhen
"Special Export Zone" on July 15 th, 1979. The originally planned
population was 350,000, of which 77 percent was to be agricultural
population. In order to cover the comprehensive characteristics,
tasks, and functions of the Shenzhen Special Zone, its name was
formally changed in March 1980 to Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone.
The boundary of the Shenzhen SEZ was delineated,
stretching 84.6 km from Beizhaijiao to its west, through Wutong
Mountain, Jigongling, Tanglang Mountain, Xili Reservoir, and
Nantou to Shekou, with an average 7 km width from north to
south (Figure 25). This zone in China differs from the export
processing zones of other countries by its comprehensiveness
and flexibility. Within SEZ boundaries, not only were export
processing activities promoted, but also agriculture, tourism, and
real estate development.2 4 To prevent smuggling, an 80-km-long
abaties (Administration Line or Second Line), 2.8-meter-high
wall, and seven-meter-wide patrol road were constructed in May
1982, with six joint checkpoints established along the path. The
SEZ city's official boundary was thus finalized. It was an enclave
and controlled area testing free-market principles that could later
integrate with the world economy.
The size of Shenzhen SEZ, 327.5 sq kin, has remained
unchanged. But in 1993, Shenzhen City's boundary was expanded
when Bao'an County was redivided into two districts that form
the two northern parts of the non-SEZ section (with an area of
1692.5 sq km), which were placed under Shenzhen Municipality's
administration.
G. Linear Form
Shenzhen (22'N, 113E) (Figure 25) is located in the
southern part of Guangdong Province, adjoining the New Territories
of Hong Kong, and with the Zhu Jiang Kou (Pearl River Estuary)
to the west, resembling a basin surrounded by hills of about 500
m on the north, south, and east banks. The Shenzhen River, 35 km
in length, is the longest stream that separates mainland China and
Hong Kong. Additionally, there are nine reservoirs of various sizes
serving the dual purposes of irrigation and flood prevention, most
of which were built in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the later 1960s,
the Shenzhen Reservoir has provided local and Hong Kong people
with potable water and resort sites. Two bays form the scenic
southern coastline of Shenzhen: Shenzhen Bay and the deeper
Dapeng Bay.
Shenzhen SEZ has a rugged topography (Figure 26) and a
humid monsoonal climate. Most of the mountains in Shenzhen are
aligned in a northeast-southwest direction. Interspersed between
mountains are rolling hills and river valleys of various sizes
between 200 and 400 meters. The settlement pattern of Shenzhen
has been dictated by this rugged landscape. Most of the SEZ is
settled along the seaside platform and plains area in the southwest
of Shenzhen City. The majority of the flat land suitable for large-
scale city development is confined to the western coastal lowlands
and to the valley floors. Railways and roads, especially in the
central part of Shenzhen, usually follow these valleys.
The landform of the city rises at the northeast corner and
falls towards the southwest. Overall, the hills take up 48.6 percent
of the total land and flat land percent. Extensive linear flat lands,
requiring relatively little reclamation or leveling and suitable
for large-scale urban and economic development, are along the
Shenzhen-Nantou corridor. Wutong Mountain has the highest peak
at 943 meters above the Yellow Sea.25 The northern and eastern
lands are mainly rolling, hilly regions endowed with great scenic
beauty favoring the development of tourist or holiday resorts.
Outside the Second Line of the SEZ, vast stretches of agricultural
land in Bao'an and Longgang counties are suitable for farming
as well as for aquaculture, providing an important base of food
production for the city and also for export.
Because of heavy rainfall, the more soluble elements in the
soil are leached and residual oxides, especially iron compounds in
the surface layer, render the soil deficient in nitrogen and give it
its typical red color.26
H. Shekou Industrial Zone
Shenzhen's western peninsula, Shekou, 30 km away from
downtown Shenzhen, was entrusted to the China Merchants Steam
Navigation Co. Ltd of Hong Kong (CMSN) (under the Ministry of
Communication) as Shekou Industrial Zone within Shenzhen SEZ
in July 1979, before the official establishment of Shenzhen SEZ.
But for administrative reasons, it was under the administration of
the Real Estate Company of Shekou Industrial Zone, a subsidiary
of CMSN. Shekou was conveniently situated next to a potential
port, Baini reservoir, and the electrical network, 50 km away from
the central district of Hong Kong.
The development plan for Shekou was disclosed on
December27, 1979, including a detailed land use zoning map. Atotal
of 266,100 sq m area was distributed to heavy, light, and chemical
industry, producing goods for export. Shekou specialized more in
heavy industrial development than any other area within the SEZ.
Most of the investment types by then were "sole proprietorships."
These included the manufacture of containers, iron and steel, ship
dismantling, aluminum rolling, oxygen production, and flour
milling.
The construction of Shekou began from "standard
mentality" "five linkages and one leveling," which included:
(a) a road link, (b) a telephone link, (c) an electricity link, (d) a
navigation link, and (e) land leveling. "Leveling the land prior to
construction work regardless of the topography of the site and the
nature of the project is a highly questionable approach, one that
fails to respect the environment and ecology. This mentality has
also been responsible for the severe land erosion in Shenzhen in the
past two decades."28
The main public and office buildings were grouped and
orientated toward the sea. Guishan Villa sat half way up Guishan
Mountain, overlooking "the World of the Sea," a tourism boat
whose name was written in Deng's own hand. To avoid competing
with the massing of the hills, the early residential plan of mimicking
massive high-rise clusters in Hong Kong was abandoned. Most
residential buildings were 5 to 6 stories high. This made possible
keeping more green spaces, which might be more attractive to
Figure 27. The plan of
Nanhai Hotel
Source: The Master
Architect Series III, Chen Ila
Shimin: Selected and r-J
Current Works (Mulgrave:
The Images Publishing
Group Pty Ltd, 1998), p.
62.
foreign investors. The designs for mixed-use residential buildings
referred to the models in Hong Kong, because most of them
would be purchased by people from Hong Kong. Commercial
space occupied the first two stories, with two- or three- bedroom
apartments (5-15 sq m each) above. High-rise architecture, 15 to 20
stories high, was placed in the central area of the zone.
Sea. Therefore, a deep-water wharf that can handle ships up to
10,000 tons was constructed, which also is used by the passenger
hovercraft connecting with Hong Kong.
Figure 28. Nanhai Hotel
Source: The Master Architect Series III, Chen Shimin: Selected and
Current Works (Mulgrave: The Images Publishing Group Pty Ltd, 1998),
p. 62.
Located on the hill side of the south tip of the peninsula,
Nanhai Hotel (Figure 27 and 28) took advantage of the fan-shaped
massif to merge into a backdrop of hill, facing the open sea view.
Five rectangular building blocks form the master plan, distributed
along a curved corridor that echoes the seashore line. The main
feature of the hotel is their terraced forms, with each ascending floor
set further back. To gain the full benefit of the site, and to be seen
by passengers taking hovercraft from Hong Kong to Shekou, the
hotel was raised one story.29 Factory construction was standardized:
light, dismantlable, flexible.
Shekou also provides port facilities for the SEZ. Chiwan,
to the south-west of Shekou, will be developed into a ship repair
and maintenance base for offshore oil drilling in the South China
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III. Zone (1980-1992)
A. Backyard Workshop Zone and Kinship
After the Second World War, foreign investments in Asian
countries and districts such as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea brought their rapid industrialization, which also led
to various urban problems. To tackle these problems, governments
in these places encouraged industrial decentralization. But the
decentralization process, economic restructuring, and keen
competition among themselves within the developed countries
forced the labor-intensive and low-value-added industrial sectors of
these areas to search for yet cheaper production sites outside their
own countries and districts. Beginning in the 1970s, manufacturing
industries in Hong Kong faced serious problems both domestically
and internationally. The escalating production costs within Hong
Kong made the once internationally competitive labor-intensive
industries decreasingly profitable or even unviable. Additionally,
demanding competition and rising protectionism from developed
countries posed challenges for these export-oriented industries
and caused certain manufacturing industries to look for lower-cost
production locations.
China's experiment with the open door policy in 1978
coincided with a period of rapid globalization. Before the open
door policy in 1978, China and Hong Kong were supposed to be
two separate economic and political entities. The open door policy
has provided a breathing zone (Figure 29) for labor-intensive and
low-value-added industries, especially for Hong Kong and Taiwan,
where increasing labor costs coupled with rising land prices and
rents have meant that labor-intensive manufacturing was no longer
sustainable. They also needed profitable new outlets for their
growing capital after their success as export-oriented economies
in the middle of the 1980s.1 Therefore, Shenzhen SEZ immediately
became the backyard factory of Hong Kong.
Since the early fifteenth century onwards, significant
numbers of people from Guangdong have emigrated to various parts
of the world, most of them to Southeast Asia. During the Cultural
Revolution from 1966 to 1976, its proximity to the then British
Colony of Hong Kong made Bao'an County the largest source of
immigrants to the rapidly urbanizing and industrializing capitalist
haven since the 1950s. By the 1980s, thirty-five thousand overseas
Chinese were from the Shenzhen area.2 Cantonese is commonly
used in Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Besides foreign investors,
the city would have special appeal-kinship and culture-to
the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. Such social relationships
cooperatively provided an effective and secure channel for global
capitalism to grow in uncultivated "socialist market" soil. Thus the
gradually transforming economy model became a haven for global
capitalism.
The overseas Chinese and foreign capital investors thus
were looking for sources of cheaper labor where certain labor-
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figure 29. Shenzhen SEZ topography and reservoirs
intensive industries could be expanded. The access to a potential
market of over one billion people was also a major psychological
attraction to them. The opening of the whole PRD to foreign capital
in 1985 accelerated the flow of foreign capital into Shenzhen.
B. Infrastructure
The early objectives of the zone were clear, though lacking
a blueprint, but it was sure to be a "live incubator" for foreign
investment in enterprises which would produce exports to earn
foreign exchange to underwrite the nation's modernization. After
several foreign visits and research, all leaders of the city agreed
that the full sound provision of infrastructure, broadly defined as
roads, railways, ports, airports, water, electricity, communication,
and housing, was essential to attract investors and for large-scale
economic development to take place. Other export processing zones
in Asia had shown that the lack of a sufficient and well-established
infrastructure system could be a major cause of failure. Generally,
the infrastructural layout would directly affect the city's form.
The implication of the large size of the Shenzhen SEZ is
the massiveness of the infrastructure construction task, considering
that prior to its designation as an SEZ the Shenzhen Municipality
was an agricultural community, deficient in road communications.
Based on conservative estimates by Chinese scholars, the cost
of infrastructure for 9,800 ha of land in the Shenzhen SEZ
would amount to at least 36.7 billion RMB yuan.3 The debatable
terminology for preparing Shenzhen's undulating lands to be
"usable" before civic and architecture construction was "seven
linkages and one leveling," which include: (a) a road link, (b)
a gas link, (c) an electricity link, (d) a water link, (e) a sewage
system link, (f) a storm drainage system link, (g) a communication
link, and (h) land leveling. The reasons that this kind of single-
minded massive leveling has been undertaken without carefully
considering the local environmental variation and characteristics
may be the industrial goals of the city, the fast pulse of economic
growth, and the mayor's heavy industrial background. To keep
pace with development needs, road network construction was
given much attention from 1979-1987. Shenzhen was, however,
also handicapped by the lack of a good harbor, in spite of its
coastal location. Along Dapeng Bay and Daya Bay, east of the city,
there are stretches of deep water, but the little available flat land is
embedded in rugged topography with steep slopes running into the
sea. 4
Investments in fixed assets were the primary means for the
city to allocate resources in such a manner as to advance economic
growth and to take advantage of technology and innovation to
develop new sectors and to enhance the structure of economic
growth and change throughout the country.5 Building a livable
place for residents was not an urgent and conscious concern at
that moment. From 1979 to 1981, a total of RMB 286 million was
invested in site preparation and capital construction and in 1982,
1985 1995
Zhuhai Shenzhen Shantou Xiamen Zhuhai Shenzhen" Shantou Xiamen
Government funds 1.6 1.6 0.0 6.3 0.7 - 2.4 4.3
Domestic funds 27.6 20.4 - - 4.2 16.6 5.6 20.2
Self-financing 41.9 45.8 30.2 20.5 63.2 50.6 57.2 41.6
Foreign capital 26.2 13.1 11.7 - 17.2 19.7 30.4 10.8
Other sources 2.7 18.1 58.1' 73.2 14.7 13.1 4.4 23.1
Note: Data for Zhuhai (1985, 1988) and Shanton (1995) refer to the entire city,
whereas those for the other SEZs pertain to the special territorial units.
'Data for Shenzhen in 1995 included both infrastructural and real estate
development.
'Bank loans.
Source: Statistical yearbooks for the SEZs (various years).
Figure 30. Financing models for infrastructure development in SEZs
(percent)
Source: Yue-man Yeung, Globalization and Networked Societies (Hono-
lulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), p. 98.
RMB 540 million was spent on large-scale development and to
speed up construction. However, the return of capital investment
from land use fees and taxes collected from foreign investors was
rather low. Although the central government has indicated that the
cities must rely on themselves for funding for infrastructure and
development, Shenzhen has been able to obtain a larger share of
funding from the state, particularly at the start in 1979 and 1980.6
Using foreign investment and capital from trade in some way
temporarily provided ample help and financed the infrastructure
construction in the early stage of the city's development, which
later proved to be a "side attraction" to the chief goal of the
SEZ. The huge capital investment in infrastructure, jumping to
4.5 billion RMB yuan by 1985, has played an important role
in the development of Shenzhen. From 1980 to 1990, a total of
23.1 billion yuan of capital investment (Figure 30) was put into
Shenzhen's physical construction.
C. Capital
Most factories in Shenzhen were engaged in export-
processing, urged by the city to an "external orientation" and Hong
Kong was the biggest client of and investor in these factories which
reflected the restructuring of global capitalism at the end of the
1970s. Domestic enterprises formed under equity share-holding are
the common format for joint ventures. Investment from Hong Kong
and foreign companies is usually in the form of equity joint ventures
(with Chinese and foreign capital, Chinese and foreign cooperative
joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned ventures) and sanlaiyibu
enterprises (enterprises engaging in export processing, assembling
and manufacturing according to foreign materials, designs and
parts, and compensation trade.)
Shenzhen SEZ had the availability of labor and land
resources, and continuous investment in the infrastructure and a set
of preferential treatments for foreign investors (in the early stage of
Shenzhen SEZ). These treatments included a 15 percent corporate
tax rate, a 1- to 3- year tax holiday in general, but five years for
investment over US$5 million, repatriation of corporate profits,
personal income after tax, and repatriation of investment capital
after completion of contract. Custom duties were free for import
Types of Economic No. of Amount of Investment % of Total
Activity Items (HK$ million) Investment
Agriculture (including 211 114.1 4.13
livestock farming &
fisheries)
Manufacturing 537 450.2 16.30
Commercial 12 217.7 7.90
Real Estate/Housing 23 1,090.2 39.50
Transportation 7 6.5 0.24
Tourism 20 781.9 28.30
Othcrs 4 100.1 3.63
Source: Economic Reporter, No. 45, 11 Nov., 1981, p. 8.
Figure 31. Investment in various economic activities in the Shenzhen
SEZ (excluding Shekou)
Source: Kwan-yiu Wong, editor, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone:
China's Experiment in Modernization (HK: Hong Kong Geographical
Association, 1982,) p. 28.
of raw materials and intermediate goods, and no export taxes were
levied for items that were eventually exported from the city. But
sales in the inland market were restricted to certain percentages.'
Other financial inducements included the ability to remit earnings
and profits in "hard" currencies; foreign investors could maintain
foreign bank accounts and settle foreign-exchange matters through
Chinese or overseas banks. Domestic enterprises could set up their
agency in Shenzhen, in which they sold their products at greatly
reduced prices, to bargain-hunt directly with foreign traders, as
well as gain access to foreign exchange.
Shangbu, Shahe, and Nantou District were planned to
be mainly developed into areas for light manufacturing and
electronics products. Because of its proximity to Luohu District and
Shenzhen town, Shangbu was planned to be an important centre for
concentrated development. Shahe is located about 12 km to the west
of Shangbu. Originally, the SEZ would only accommodate modern
industries with advanced and "green" technology. However, some
obsolete and polluting industries were also introduced. The city
concentrated them in the Kuichong area; there the effluents from
various factories could be collectively treated. This taught the
government the lesson that advanced technology did not necessarily
mean environmental protection and that it should be more stringent
in considering the types of industries to be introduced.
Before 1985, the city was mostly kept going by domestic
investment, while multinational capital remained largely aloof In
the initial stages of Shenzhen's development, most of the foreign
investment was channeled into such areas as housing/real estate
and tourism in which the return period was short and the marginal
profit was higher than in manufacturing; the small amount of it in
manufacturing was confined primarily to small enterprises doing
processing and assembly work. With the gradual maturing of the
economy and improving of infrastructure, however, direct foreign
investment accounted for two-thirds of the total realized foreign
investment in Shenzhen by the end of 1987.8
Investment from Hong Kong has proved to be important for
Shenzhen's economic takeoff. As of December 1981, for example,
50.6 percent of the total foreign direct investment in China was
being attracted to Shenzhen, 9 and 91 percent of the total overseas
1979
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Figure 32. Shenzhen, 1979
Source: www.geocarto.com.hk/pearl3.htm 1949 Luohu Customs HouseLA
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
CCI (Y millions) 125 270 633 886 1555 2761 1915 2157 3473 4354 4950
in which SSEZ's CCI (%) 90.4 98.0 92.7 94.4 94.8 94.2 96.5 94.9 98.5 97.5 98.5
in total CCI:
CG' (Y millions) 33.0 22.7 47.4 43.7 21.1 42.9 49.6 12.3 27.3 11.8 10.4
(%) 26.4 8.4 7.4 4.9 1.3 1.6 2.6 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2
LGO (Y millions) 9.6 33.4 64.0 78.0 212.9 450.1 345.5 286.2 383.7 594.4 568.0
(%) 7.7 12.4 10.1 8.8 13.0 16.3 18.0 13.3 11.1 13.7 11.5
OI (Y millions) 53.9 135.5 191.4 222.1 265.0 360.7 346.6 335.6 520.8 1356.2 1764.9
(%) 43.2 50.0 30.3 25.1 16.2 13.1 18.1 15.6 15.0 31.2 35.7
DBLd (Y millions) 7.0 31.6 202.9 334.1 639.7 563.5 272.1 382.2 562.1 508.7 891.3
(%) 5.6 11.7 32.1 37.7 41.1 20.4 14.2 17.7 16.2 11.7 18.0
DEC (Y millions) 21.3 47.0 127.0 205.2 375.5 1293.3 793.0 922.5 1466.5 1433.2 1278.8
(%) 17.0 17.5 20.1 23.2 23.4 46.8 41.4 42.8 42.2 32.9 25.8
* CG: investment from central government; b LG: investment from local governments; C 01: investment from overseas; d DBL: domestic
bank loans; * DE: investment from domestic enterprises.
Source: SSEZ Statistics Year Book, 1991.
Figure 33. Capital construction investment (CCI) in Shenzhen Munici-
pality (1980-90)
Source: Jieming Zhu, "Denationalization of Urban Physical Develop-
ment: The Experiment in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, China,"
in Cities, 1996, Vol. 13, no. 3, p. 193.
investment came from Hong Kong.10 By the end of 1981, more than
HK 2,760 million had been distributed the SEZ's various economic
sectors. It is interesting that the highest investment was in real estate
development (39.5 percent) in 1981, followed by substantial capital
investment in tourism, accounting for 28.3 percent. Manufacturing
accounted for 16.3 percent of total investment. Compared with the
above, investment in transportation, a long-term investment, was
negligible. Hong Kong investors were concerned with quick return
rather than long-term development (Figure 31).
Non-state sectors were also able to place 55.8 percent of
the total RMB 12.7 billion investment from 1983 to 1988 into fixed
assets." In 1980, fiscal appropriations from the central government
accounted for 26.4 percent of the total capital investment in
Shenzhen's physical construction, but it dwindled to 0.2 percent in
1990 (Figure 33). This clearly indicates that non-state sectors have
been playing significant roles in financing and shaping the city,
stimulated by land reform and market mechanisms after 1987.
D. The First Socio-Economic Development Plan (1982)
In 1979 Shenzhen (Figure 32) was an agricultural and fishing
area with no funding, technology, or land development experience
in building a new city. The agricultural economy predominated,
with good grain production that constituted over 75 percent of
the total output in the late 1970s. "Rural industry, defined by the
provincial authorities as industry located at and below the village
level, made up only a small portion of the total industrial output."' 2
Considering the scale of infrastructure construction, Shenzhen
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Figure 34. The First Socio-Economic Development Plan
Source: Guangzhou Geography Institute, Natural Resources and Economic Development Illustrations (Beijing: Science Publishing House,,
1985.)
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Figure 35. Transport network plan of the SEZ. It should be based on The First Socio-Economic Development Plan.
Source: Kwan-yiu Wong, and David K. Y Chu, editors, Modernization in China: The Case of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Oxford:;
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 155.
intended to introduce foreign capital, especially that associated
with the global trading network, as a means to finance economic
growth and construction. The city's early objectives and strategies
were not much divergent from the other members of the free zone
family, although it was a comprehensive economic development
zone with a considerable size. The city was thought of originally as
an export-processing zone during this period, where multinational
capital could be attracted into joint ventures (JVs) with the large
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with a view to reorganization
and technology transfer. Export-oriented economic activities were
to be encouraged to generate and accumulate foreign exchange
earnings.
Based on this comprehensive object, the plan around
1978-1979 proposed a 10.65 sq km city area and a population
of 200,000-300,000. However, in 1980, after the ordinance
establishing Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province,
Shenzhen organized more than one hundred experts to reassess and
revise the draft plan, although the resulting plan was still sketchy
by today's standards. The new city region was extended to 50 sq
km and the planned population to 500,000 by 1990. This meant that
even greater capital investment in infrastructure construction would
be required to make the city attractive for foreign investors. Two
engineers, Zhu Qihao and Deng Shang, were principal designers
of this draft comprehensive plan. Five districts (Luohu, Shangbu,
Shuiku, Shenzhen reservoir, and Wenjindu Customs) were planned
in detail, as well as plans for bridges, roads, a sewer system,
gardens, gas, and power supply facilities. This plan designated the
width of Shennan Road and Sungang Road as 50 meters. The traffic
pattern in Luohu was based on the old road system, while that of
new Shangbu District used a rectangular grid. The rectangular
blocks obliterated the agricultural fields, hills, rivers, and woods.
These changes eradicated genius-loci and stamped on a "universal"
square mark, except that a few hills, such as Lianhua Mountain,
were left-the land pattern always exhibits its owner's will. The
Comprehensive Plan also vaguely pegged Futian as the city's new
commercial business district (CBD), but its fleshing out was really
carried out only after 1995.
The planning process of Shenzhen was the first in China to
face the challenge of working with the so-called mechanisms of the
market economy. Under the grand national goal of modernization,
the long-term role of Shenzhen, still a top-to-bottom process,
was clearly defined by the central government: a comprehensive
economic zone. In September 1981 Vice Premier Bo Yibo stated
that "we should treat Shenzhen SEZ as a major city, even more
important than a large city." The mayor Liang Xiang then pointed
out that the draft plan had not yet expansively reflected the mixed
goals of the zone-industry, agriculture, tourism, housing, and
commerce. A Shenzhen SEZ socio-economic development plan
embodied in the city master layout plan was urgently needed,
whose theory was grounded on the ordinance of Special Economic
Zones in Guangdong Province. In December 1982, Shenzhen City
released its first Socio-Economic Development Plan (Figure 34) for
the Special Economic Zone in which the planners showed a more
flexible and dynamic attitude. The total planning area was 118.6
sq km and the population was about one million by year 2000.13
Export-oriented industrial growth was the key to the economic
development plan. Major industrial sectors with 1,500 factories
occupying 7.2 sq km of land, and residential areas for 200,000
workers were projected, with schematic proposed infrastructure to
attract foreign investment.14 Different land uses were functionally
separated.
A 30 sq km area of land around Luohu and Shangbu
districts was zoned, based on 10,000 population per sq km.1" The
planning system still followed the traditional two-tier planning
system introduced in the 1950s: the Master Plan and the Specific
Site Plan (or detailed layout plan). Master plans were generally
for coordination between newly built factories and the existing
urban area, while detailed layout plans were for the layout of
factories and workers' villages.16 Both plans, intended to support
industrial projects approved by economic planning, lacked a clear
definition of the intensity, size, scale, and legal responsibility for
land development and operable control mechanisms to modify the
rights of both the private and public sectors.
Given Shenzhen's narrow landform, with a hilly region
mainly in the north, and urgent need for external transport links
between Hong Kong and the hinterland, the city's early planners
naturally applied the Western linear city concept, proposed at the
end of the 19 th century, with a few districts threaded along a major
transportation artery, Shennan Boulevard. In its early "creating"
phase, the planning of Shenzhen was focused on improving the
investment environment: meeting the needs of growth and giving
priority to industrial projects. Most traffic, except in Luohu District,
was still laid out on the rectangular network grid (Figure 35); the
principal arteries were east-west (40-60 meters wide), with north-
south being the secondary traffic. "The city's layout should be based
on the traffic backbones, the widths of which refer to modem traffic
flow standards, and then different functional districts defined. To
enhance comprehensive economic efficiency, we put residential
areas relatively close to industrial zones, warehouses close to
train stations and ports. Zoning is not fixed, but flexible. It may
be adjusted locally, with changing situations."" Such functional
criteria to facilitate transportation for an industrial zone set the
basic tone of Shenzhen's city form.
The planners also put some efforts into providing a decent
living environment to investors. Ebenezer Howard's Garden City
urban form was studied and incorporated into the linear layout,
which thus included a few green-belts separating three clusters
having 18 functional districts. Using green belts (12 percent of the
land) and creating parks indicated that Shenzhen paid attention to its
future environmental issues from its inception, and somehow these
physical features connected with a repeated call to develop the city
into a "garden city." Impressed by Singapore's large-scale green
space during his visit in 1983, the mayor, Liang Xiang, and the
Government decided that "all buildings should set back the red line
for 30 meters" for green spaces. A theme park, Fairy Lake Botanic
Garden (to show Shenzhen's biological diversity), People Park,
Honghu Park, an 800-meter-wide north-south green strip next to
Shenzhen telecommunication company, Children's Park, and Litchi
Park, next to the city hall, were thus expanded and constructed. It
was thought that, by grouping all green space in confined clusters
along a transport corridor, the urban form could allow "phasing
and rapid growth starting from the border area near Hong Kong""
and be an effective solution to accommodate such urban expansion.
More importantly, such an urban form also "defined clearly where
government funding should be allocated, and in turn, effectively
led to a desirable pattern of urban construction."19 The separation
of home and workplace was taking place for enterprises of all sizes,
and housing construction needed to be massive and fast.
Under a transitional centrally-planned economic model,
urban planning, still intended to stimulate industrial growth, was
very powerful in deciding land uses and urban development-the
state controlled diverse resource allocation. This plan was in fact
seeking physical transportation and financial efficiency: limited
infrastructural investment could serve most industrial districts
and ports. "Goods" transfer was actually paid more attention
than people. Urban planning of this kind would enable urgent
city industrialization. Indeed, the government's priority for urban
development was infrastructure construction to draw foreign
investment. Urban design was neglected. Its role with architecture
was the simple definition of building density, height, and layout;
planning involved unsystematic spatial design, apart from some
parks or green belts along the main roads. Although planners
wanted to use the synthetic streetscape as the basic criterion for
building construction selection, in reality there was a lack of
continuous execution of the plan; the plan did not impose effective
legalized parameters on building design.
The master plan, although it could not guarantee the success
of the SEZ, sought to enforce control over phased development and
to coordinate the provision of infrastructure and public utilities. The
plan concentrated largely on the contained linear zone, proceeding
without coordination with surrounding counties. At this moment,
the master plan acted as a guide and had no legal status; violations
would be criticized, but not punished, though four other sets of
regulations on the registration of enterprises, land use, visas, and
labor and wages were intended to provide a secure environment for
foreign investment. For instance, when a real estate company from
Hong Kong showed interest in developing an area and approached
the authorities in Beijing, "the planned population of the area was
increased to 300,000 and it became one of the largest projects in
the SEZ then."2
E. Speed: Luohu and Shangbu Districts (1980-1986)
Figure 36. Slogan [Time is money; efficiency is life.]
The government wanted to make road updating and
construction the first step to attract investors and catalyze major
districts' improvements such as Luohu and Shangbu Districts.
Shennan Boulevard, a simple rough gravel surface, was the national
road 107 to Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province. This
major east-west road was updated to asphalted pavement, which
later grew to be the central scenic boulevard of the city. Due to
a limited bank loan (RMB 30 million) and to create a "good"
impression for foreign visitors, the development of Luohu District
became the priority, on account of its proximity to Luohu Customs
House and railway station. In 1980, the infrastructure construction
team led by the head Luo Changren swiftly removed the Luohu
massif that was next to the old Shenzhen train station, and used
that earth (1.5 million cb m) to raise the 0.8 sq m district 1.07
Figure 37. Army specialists in infrastructure construction
Source: Shenzhen Archive Bureau
meters. Until then, Shenzhen had no official master plan to guide
the city's urban development. It seemed that personal experience
and authorities' words were the action guidance. The 1982 master
plan apparently accelerated road construction, with 25 streets in
progress simultaneously in that year. By 1985, 63 streets, totaling
90 km long, were done.
To avoid lengthy bureaucratic processes (Figure 36) and
speed up construction, five governmental functions (urban planning,
land use, development permission, construction supervision, and
management) were merged into one section and coordination
among administration bureaus strictly enforced to avoid recursive
procedures. This synthesis method seemed still not to be able to
achieve the required development trend. The central government
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-- Figure 39. Luohu District, 1982
Figure 40. Design concepts of International Trade Building
Source: Zi Ou, "The Design of International Trade Center," in The Shen-
zhen Construction Technique Document Compilation (Shenzhen: Shen-
zhen Building Science Center, 1987), no. 1, p. 21.
sent 20 thousand army specialists (Figure 37) in infrastructure
construction to give help on civic projects. In September 1983,
these troops converted to Shenzhen civic and infrastructure
companies. Moreover, to ensure fast and large-scale development,
five SOEs (City Construction Development Company, Industry
Development and Service Company, Trust Investment Company,
Guangdong Nuclear Service Company, and Nanhai Oil (Shenzhen)
Development Company) from different central government
departments were established to develop designated raw lands.
"Fast track" could not guarantee the physical quality, but it did
ensure that urban hardware could catch up with the economic
growth and suit the political environment of the time.
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Manufacturing industries were to be the backbone of
Shenzhen (40 percent of realized direct foreign investment in
the SEZ went to the manufacturing sector in the 1980s). This
was to be followed by transportation and communication as well
as commercial and service activities. Fifteen industrial zones,
mainly composed of "international style" multi-story boxes, were
established, and large attention was given to urban infrastructure
construction and the balance between the needs for housing and
employment. The first industrial sector was Shangbu light industry
district, total building area 120,000 sq m. Next to it was the
Bagualin industry zone. The Electronic Building and Huaqiang
electronic complex, the Science Building, the city hall, Donghu
Hotel, and Xinyuan Hotel were also under construction during this
period.
Within this industrial zone, housing, shopping, and
Figure 41. Shenzhen, 1984 by Tian Kesheng
entertainment were one major element of the plan. Hence, Luohu,
a three sq km old town near Hong Kong's New Territories, was
designated as the commercial center for the SEZ, while Shatoujiao
to the east and Shekou to the west were used as industrial districts.
To accommodate inter-urban representatives and stimulate
domestic economic connections, the city decided to build a first
mixed-use high-rise (originally 38 stories, but eventually going to
53) in May 1981: the International Trade Building (ITB). The first
high-rise building had its noticeable political significance, as well
as economic objectives. It symbolized that China would open its
door to the world to initiate the country's modernization journey,
Figure 42. Movement arrangement
Source: Zi Ou, "The Design of International Trade Center," in The Shen-
zhen Construction Technique Document Compilation (Shenzhen: Shen-
zhen Building Science Center, 1987), no. 1, p. 21.
and consciously delivered a message to domestic visitors, an image
or vision somehow associated with modernization. Because of its
height, it could be seen from the Hong Kong border, which might
lure Hong Kong people to unconsciously realize what Shenzhen
was becoming: the Window of China. After its completion at
the end of 1985, it immediately became the symbol of the city,
landmark of the district, and a tourist attraction hub in the 1980s
Al
Figure 43. The International Trade Building
and 90s.
Among four tenders for the ITB, the Vice mayor picked
the preliminary design by Li Zhuojian and Yuan Peihuang along
with Zhu Zhenhui, Chen Songlin, Ou Zi, and Zhu Wenhui,
from Hubei Industrial Architectural Institution (Figure 40).
Movement circulation and traffic arrangement (Figure 42, 43,
and 44) determined the building's siting and the relationship with
neighborhood high-rise buildings. A 150-meter-long four-story
commercial store and a 160-meter-high rectangle were the basic
spatial organization, with two discs on top of each, seeking visual
balance for the principal facades. The 49th story is a rotating
restaurant: a place to observe the morphological change speed
of the zone. Functional grouping was the guiding principle of the
building, which included office, commercial, and entertainment
space, converging at the glass-roofed 19-meter-high central court
and foyer. "We start from functional requirements, technological
economics; after synthetic analysis and judgment, we first sketch
out the relationship diagram and then deduce the plan layout," 22
one designer said. Again, function alone was the form generator.
Intensifying the visual contrast of the facade, brown vertical convex
glass curtain walls and flat silver aluminum skin panels were applied.
Its construction progress set the record of three days per story, by
using innovative sliding module and jump crane technology, and
made newspaper headlines for a while. Architectural construction
speed alone, a social phenomenon maker, became a vital judgment
Perspective of International Commercial Building.
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Figure 45. International Commercial Building
Source:China Building Development 1982/83
Publication, 1982).
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of a newly born being. The explanation might be that China lost ten
entire years in the unsteady Cultural Revolution. Prompt pacing
rearoused people's self-reliance to confront new challenges. This
also created part of "the spirit of the Special Economic Zone,"
associated with time and efficiency, to show the rest of the country
the SEZers' will and attitude toward the reform.
Due to the ITB's closeness to Luohu Customs House
checkpoint and train station, and inadequate available land
resources in the early 1980s, an increasing number of commercial
transactions and liaisons of various forms would take place around
this area. Existing offices and services in Shenzhen Town were
far from sufficient. In addition to factories and warehouses, to
accommodate the boom in Hong Kong visitors and investors,
Shenzhen built a few high-rise residential compounds near the
Luohu Customs House, which was the first high-rise group in China
and considered to have symbolized the change and modernity
brought by the reform. It formed the commercial core of Luohu
District, which was a harbinger of multi-functional uses in a city
intended for industrial purposes. The vicinity of the International
Trade Building agglomerated the densest high-rise residential and
office buildings and served as the city's early commercial business
district, an initial testing place for Shenzhen's real estate. For
example, Shenzhen International Commercial Building (Figure
45), 5,420 sq m, was being built jointly by Chung-Fat Tai-Tung
Property Co. and Shenzhen Property Co, providing banks, display
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Figure 46. The city's growth direction
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Figure 47. Luohu District, 1986
rooms, and restaurants at ground level, with an upper 18
stories devoted to office spaces ranging from 31 to 67
sq m. However, some high-rise building gaps were so
small that they were called "shaking hands buildings."
The development of many of those high-rise buildings
was join with Hong Kong companies and grafted on
Hong Kong high-rise residential design, even some
room layouts. Later, after the city managers realized that
high-rise clusters required immense maintenance costs,
the planning tactic shifted thereafter to assorted building
ensities and heights for residential blocks.
The first high-rise residential district in China
was Baishalin residential district (66.5 ha. for 38,000
to 40,000; FAR 3.16 and 80 sq m/ family) (Figure
48, 49, and 50), adjacent to Baguailin industrial zonejn Shangbu District.23 In 1984, the Architectural
Department of Tongji University was invited to design
and plan this district. Within two months, the draft
design was finished. Symbolizing open but centripetal
spatial characteristics, the master plan appeared like a
chrysanthemum, with higher buildings inside and lower
ones outside. Fourteen curved 24 to 30-story buildings
radiated outward, forming a core and an enclave central
green space. Ground levels of some buildings were
used for commercial purposes, connected through
K(7
Figure 48. The master plan of Baishalin residential district
Source:Shenzhen Urban Planning and -Land Administration Bureau,
Shenzhen City Atlas (Xi'an: Xi'an Meihang Map Publishing House,
1997), p. 92.
roofed public corridors. Separating pedestrian walks and traffic
flow and connecting with four existing road entrances were also
major considerations and composed a diamond-shaped framework
of roads. The edge of the district was not well defined by physical
forms, except a 30-meter green belt, because no design emphasis
on the block edge and traffic node appeared in the city's master
plan guidelines. These large elevations rarely allowed visual
Figure 49. Design concept
Source:Shenzhen Building Science Center,
Shenzhen Construction Technique Docu-
ment Compilation, (Shenzhen: Information
Department, Shenzhen Building Science
Center,1987), no. 1.
Figure 50. Elevation
Source:Shenzhen Building Science Center, Shenzhen Construction
Technique Document Compilation, (Shenzhen: Information Department,
Shenzhen Building Science Center,1987), no.1.
penetration, which, combined with super block size, made people
feel the overwhelming massiveness of the district. Therefore, each
block of Shenzhen might functionally work well alone, but blocks
had less incremental contribution to building up a unique city
spatial wholeness.
Hong Kong became a convenient gateway to China, while
Shenzhen was an ideal place for short-term tourists who might not
want to spend more than a few days in China. Motivated by the high
potential of quick return and given the severe hotel and catering
Figure 51. Summer Xiaomeisha by Li Shinan
facilities shortage, entrepreneurs from Hong Kong recommended
hotel and restaurant projects to the SEZ authority; the former
covered all development costs and the latter provided the land.
The development of Bamboo Garden Hotel and Xiaomeisha Beach
Resort Village (Figure 51) were examples. Additionally, since the
city was interested in promoting the tourist industry and opening
up more tourist spots to bring in more revenue to sustain the city's
growth, eight spots (Shenzhen, Xili Reservoirs, Bijia Shan Silver
Lake, Xichong, Chiwan, Dameisha, and Xiaomeisha Beaches)
had been designated for active tourist expansion; most of them
were close to reservoirs and beaches. Along with the opening of
eight tourist spots, linking roads and accommodation hotels were
also actively programmed by the city. Shenzhen Reservoirs Park,
constructed in 1960 for supplying water to Hong Kong, provided
hiking trails, boating, pavilions, a restaurant, and an art exhibition
hall. Xili Reservoir, located 30 km to the northwest of Shenzhen,
was prepared for camping, cycling, horseback riding, shooting, and
archery. Xiaomeisha is a fine natural beach, 36 nautical miles from
Hong Kong, providing a high-end hotel, a golf course, yachting,
and fishing. Some quick real estate projects located in Luohu and
Shangbu Districts were developed by Hong Kong-based property
companies, in cooperation with the Shenzhen Property Co. Most of
them are 2 to 5-story residential buildings, with profit sharing at 4:
3 (Shenzhen Government: investors).
By the end of 1985, fixed asset and infrastructure investment
totaled 6.4 billion, with Luohu and Shangbu having expanded into
38.7 sq km of new districts and the total population reaching
470,000. The transportation spine, which was largely completed
by 1991 with the opening of the two ports and the airport, basically
follows the city's coastline from east to west, and its completion
made Shenzhen a major manufacturing corridor for South China
and encouraged urban development along the major routes.
F. Land and Housing Reform
Before the reform began, the Constitution stated that "no
organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease
or unlawfully transfer land in other ways." Land and property
development had been excluded from economic activity before the
reform. Government acted omnipotently as financier, land owner,
developer, and investor in all urban land and property development.
Governments provided public housing and supplied offices and
factories; individual initiatives and dynamic market forces were
largely repressed.
From 1982 to 1985, external projects flocked to Shenzhen
with twofold annual increases. Shenzhen and all of China had had
no land market, with all land owned by the state and distributed
to SOEs without fees. Many investors demanded premises to rent
or to buy land in order to be able to construct factories and start
production immediately. Pushed by this market impulse, in January
1982, the Shenzhen Land Management Regulation declared the
end of the era of free land use in the SEZ. From 1982 to 1983,
the SEZ Development Company (SDC), one of the SOEs of the
city, leveled and made infrastructure connections for an area of
80 ha in Luohu commercial district and let 40 ha of buildable
land to tenants at an average lump sum rent of HK$ 4000-5000/
sq m, valid for 30 years. Shenzhen Housing Company obtained
three sq km of land and began the first test in China of commercial
residential housing projects. From January to April 1980, the
company's lands were coupled with capital from Hong Kong
firms to develop Donghu, Cuizhu, and Hubin high-end housing.
In September, the firm offered another 12,000 sq m of land close
to Luohu Customs House to a Hong Kong company to build two
20-story high-rise buildings, the first mixed-use high-rise in China.
In 1983, the Shenzhen Government appointed 8 SOEs to be state-
owned developers undertaking comprehensive urban construction
in the market environment in all districts, and in 1984 some of
them were allowed to become independent enterprises to compete
with other foreign or private developers. SOEs in Shenzhen began
to transform from being government land distributors to being
market-oriented construction firms (or real estate firms). This was
a unique transitional period when urban development could begin
to be conducted based on the commercial principle.
In 1987, rights associated with a parcel of land were
first auctioned in Shenzhen, which ended the age-old free land
allocation system. This was epoch-making, although the state
still owned the lands. Land use rights henceforth could be sold or
transferred as a commodity in the market, which forced planners
to re-think their practice. Before this, 99.8 percent of land was
assigned to users through administrative allocation without
transfers of land use rights and it belonged to SOEs of various
government institutions. In December 1988, the National People's
Congress amended the Land Administration Law to say that "the
land use rights of state or collective-owned land may be transferred
in accordance with the law." Allowing selling of land-use rights as
a commodity was a pragmatic shift of Marxism. The value of the
commercialized right to use land was recognized, which led to the
establishment of a land market, permitting efficient and flexible
allocation of land resources. In January 1988 new legislation-The
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Figure 52. Land price per residential floor area (yuan/sq m), 2001
Source: Shenzhen Real Estate Yearbook 2002 (Shenzhen: Haitian Publishing House, 2002), p. 73 .
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Source: Shenzhen Real Estate Yearbook 2002 (Shenzhen: Haitian Publishing House, 2002), p. 72 .
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Figure 54. The First Socio-Economic Development Plan
Source: "Scaling New Heights and Opening Up Paths for Advance," in New Look ofShenzhen Special Economic Zone (Beijing: The Red Flag
Publishing House 1985)
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Provisional Ordinances on Land Management of Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone-was published. It said that land use rights could
be transferred, leased, assigned, bequeathed, and mortgaged.
Before 1978, housing was also a "free good" built
and constructed by the individual enterprise unit. Housing
commoditization in China meant to turn housing from a free
good to a "subsidized good," and eventually to a "commodity."
Commoditization implied the right of property possession. The
initial housing reform (1984-1993) focused on establishing a
rental market for housing and selling publicly-owned dwellings by
providing large government subsidies. The reforms can be seen as
a means of raising funds to build new housing. However, although
rents were low, large numbers of people were still unable to afford
housing, and these programs were unable to generate significant
housing sales in 1984. In 1988 the central government decided to
stop-the subsidy promotion of housing sales and sought to establish
a market-based system of housing provision and privatization.
Of those buildings completed for the market in 1992, the
residential sector accounted for roughly 82 percent nationwide. In
urban areas, the major responsibility for providing housing rests
with work units (SOEs and other public sector organizations) and
housing bureaus. To avoid social unrest, of buildings completed in
that year in Shenzhen, only 65 percent were market-rate. Housing
remained a priority for the Government as the economy grew. The
housing market was in a mixed and separated condition-welfare
housing for the lowest income group (mainly for people working
for the Government and SOEs), minimal-profit housing (allowing
developers only a certain minimal profit margin), and actual
commodity housing. The commodity housing was further divided
into two sub-sectors: internal market commodity housing and
external market commodity housing (foreigners only). In Shenzhen,
the residential price for the "internal commodity market was about
1/5 to 1/9 of that of the external commodity market."25 From 1989
onward to 1999, 50 residential neighborhoods had been developed.
Residential prices (US$1200 sq m in May 1993) in Shenzhen were
always high compared to the other PRD cities.
7.1 million sq m of land were to be put on the market, of
which 321,000 sq m were to be put up for tender, of which 93,000
sq m were to be available for foreign investors.26 It was estimated
that 6.6 million sq m of residential floor area were planned to be
developed in 1993 alone. In this year, the reform of the housing
system also ignited the long-awaited Chinese real estate industry.
The release of land value strengthened the city's ability to finance its
construction projects and land became a major means of primitive
capital accumulation for government authorities at various levels.
Speculation on land by both enterprises and native villagers was
widespread. Land development could be found everywhere;
grounds were leveled, soil erosion accelerated, and ecological
environments damaged.
The introduction of the land market has turned the urban
440
1979 18
I~VII 1
Figure 55. The Master Plan of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 1985
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning Committee, Shenzhen Urban Planning and Design (Shenzhen: Haitian Publishing House 1990), p. 16.
1979 1985
spaces into a contested terrain of different prices (Figure 52 and
53). During the second property boom (1988-1993), partly as a
result of speculation, the price of housing and shops increased by 6
times (YSRE 1995), after the new market witnessed a tremendous
appreciation of property values. To curb the overheated economy
and land speculation the city established special licenses to
limit new projects and the central government imposed macro-
adjustment measures.
Figure 56. Belt-cluster planning concept
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G. The Second Socio-Economic Development Plan (1984-1989)
In early 1984, Deng Xiaoping paid an official visit to
Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and highly praised the zones. Subsequently,
fourteen coastal cities were designated as being open to foreign
investment. Former premier Zhao Ziyang also visited Shenzhen
in December 1984. Both men demanded that Shenzhen play a
strengthened more comprehensive economicroleontop ofits original
role as an exporting base-that it became a national radiation pivot
1 -0
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(Four Windows: technology, management, knowledge, and open
windows; and Two Radiations: a medium connecting domestic and
foreign). Deng reiterated the government's determination by saying
"the open door policy will not be changed; if changed, it will only
become even more open. Without the open policy, there is no hope
for the four modernizations" (Ta KungPao, August 4th 1985). At the
first meeting of the Shenzhen Urban Planning Committee in May
1986, Major Li Hao emphasized 1) using some foreign cities as
good examples for Shenzhen planning's reference; 2) introducing
advanced and automatically controlled public utilities; 3) gaining
economic returns based on sequential development phasing; and
4) seeking balance between current needs and future visions, and
economic and social development. Shenzhen's future growth
should be aimed at the connection with Hong Kong, to promote the
prosperity of both. Some expensive cultural projects should either
be executed at a lower standard or deferred. The government also
updated the threshold of selecting those enterprises that export
at least 70 percent of their goods among large-scale high-tech
enterprises.
In 1985 there were widespread comments on the poor
performance of the Shenzhen SEZ in terms of the heavy capital
expenditure on infrastructure provision, the low level of foreign
capital input, insufficient investment in manufacturing production,
the draining of valuable foreign exchange in commodity trading,
and the shift in the role of the city away from export-oriented
economic entities. Up to 1985, Shenzhen SEZ had spent RMB
4,500 million on infrastructure construction and an estimated 40
percent went towards urban construction, communications, and
post and telecommunications installations, but only managed to
obtain less than half of that amount in foreign capital (Ming Pao,
October 16th 1985). Only 30 to 40 percent of industrial production
was exported. Large quantities of foreign goods entered the city
every year to penetrate into other parts of China via the stream of
domestic travelers (two million in 1985 alone), taking advantage
of the price differentials of a wide range of commodities. Initial
projects in Shenzhen involved tourism, recreation, retail, luxury
hotels, and housing development. It seemed that efficient economic
structure rather than construction speed should be the government's
focus.
In 1986, referencing and adopting Hong Kong's urban
planning standard and experience, the China Academy of
Urban Planning and Design Shenzhen, invited by the municipal
government, completed the Second Socio-Economic Development
Plan (Figure 54 and 55), further solidifying current, medium-
term, and long-term economic goals. The planning area was 123
sq km and the projected population 1.1 million. It also defined
paramount strategic issues such as the city's coordination with
Hong Kong after its handover after 1997; century-crossing projects
such as the utilization of Yantian and Mawan deepwater ports;
and the construction of a petrol-chemistry base. The five clusters,
Shatoujiao, Luohu-Shangbu, Futian, Overseas Chinese Town,
and Nantou, divided by topography and rivers and including 15
industrial districts within them, were clearly specified as relatively
independent systems. To reduce cross traffic within the SEZ,
comprehensive functions were allocated within each cluster,
and each cluster had its own foremost role (Figure 56). Due to
mountainous coastal geological features, the Eastern cluster has
tourist attractions and a good port; the Luohu and Shangbu clusters
are for commerce, storage, housing, government offices, and
industrial zones; Futian cluster would be used for international
financial, commercial, trading, and convention purposes; Shahe
cluster is composed of Overseas Chinese City and colleges,
tourism, and industrial zones; Nantou cluster, which is the largest
comprehensive cluster, includes Shekou, Qinhai reserved land,
Nanhai Oil Logistic Service Base, Science and Technology Park,
Shenzhen University, and Mawan Port. All the land uses for the
five clusters along three east-west transportation arteries (Shennan
Boulevard, Beihuan Road, and Binhai Coastal Road) were defined.
The traffic nodes and network were deliberately organized (Figure
57 and 58). Creating expressways to Guangzhou and the rest of
PRD were an urgent solution to rapidly expanding traffic volume.
Wide bicycle paths were separated from main roads, which would
be additional roads for cars in the future. Beihuan express road,
located in the northern city, would become the chief east-west
goods transportation artery.
Luohu and Wenjindu Customs Houses were expanded,
and to facilitate logistic transportation from Hong Kong, three
new customs houses, Shatoujiao, Shekou, and Xiaomeisha, were
planned to be opened. This time, planners paid attention to city
design and environmental protection. For instance, they attempted
to use buildings to create an alternating "open" and "compression"
spatial rhythm along Shennan Boulevard; some heavily polluting
factories would be forced to move out of the SEZ; waste water would
be treated before its discharging into rivers; besides existing parks,
the plan also arranged for public green spaces and 22 more parks.
Prospective lands were conserved in advance in case of ambitious
future needs. For instance, Gongmin and Hengang counties outside
the SEZ were reserved for satellite city development; the paths for
the subway and light rail routes were schematically delineated and
the land for the two runways of Shenzhen International Airport,
based on international airport standards, was reserved to the west
of the city. The plan also outlined the design for a potential new
downtown, a 4 sq km site located in Futian District for the city's
future CBD development.
The plan was, a semi-open enacting process, intended to be
standing on a high point to look far. It sought a flexible balanced
position for the city's rapid economic development and population
growth, in order to meet possible future needs and to ensure each
cluster could be strategically developed, based on economic
phasing. It was the first time that each cluster was encouraged to
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seek its own spatial character development (through international
design competitions) and define in some detail the land uses. But
the plan unnecessarily decided the benchmark color for the city's
architecture's color: white and milk yellow.
The second plan was a landmark in Shenzhen's urban
planning history. It integrated two indispensable elements,
socio-economic and spatial planning, together. However, rural
towns outside the SEZ were still not covered by the plan. These
towns, working hard to attract industrial factories through the
establishment of their own mini-economic zones inside villages
and on arable land, randomly grew on their own for about 10
years along the major northern highway linking to the northern
hinterland. Shenzhen Municipality had very limited control over
the development occurring outside the SEZ. Moreover, residential
housing density in some areas of Luohu District was rather high in
order to obtain higher economic return, causing some unpleasantly
compact high-rise groups. This plan, although it had a land use
category for commercial activities, did not clearly specify the
proportion for it, as it did for the other five major categories such
as residential (20-22 percent) and manufacturing (15-17 percent).2"
Commercial land use was thus not plotted on the master plan. The
plan had seriously underestimated the rate of population growth
which would be encouraged by better paid employment. This plan
was revised again in 1989, with a projected population of 2 million
by 2000, and an urban area expanded to 150 sq km.
H. New Planning Practice (1989- )
During the Cultural Revolution, urban planning was utterly
abandoned and planning bureaus were dismissed. Subsequently,
within the framework of a national goal of self-sufficiency for
each province or region, the planning would consider, in order
of importance: (1) function, (2) economics, and (3) aesthetics. In
1984, the Regulation of Urban Planning was promoted by the State
Council, a guide for urban planning practice. In 1989, the City
Planning Act, a milestone in the history of Chinese urban planning,
was enacted, which set up a comprehensive urban planning system
by law for the first time.
The shortcomings of the earlier two-tier urban planning
system had been exposed during the deepening of economic
reform. In Guangdong and Jiangsu Provinces, some investors were
free to ignore the local planning regulations and take advantage of
some "vacant areas" of the planning system. This was a particularly
serious problem at the county level outside major municipalities, in
particular the misuse of arable land for urban purposes. Inadequate
development control led to the diminishing effectiveness of urban
planning.
One of China's most prominent renaissance men, Yu
Guangyuan, pointed out in 1982 the importance of city-centered
economic development regions. After 1984, to achieve the
goal of annihilating the gap between town and country and
integrating industry and agriculture, Chinese cities extended their
administrative boundaries to include a number of outer ring rural
counties (xian). The outer ring constitutes the sources of the central
city's grain, daily non-staple food supply, and land resources for
future development. Geographers and urban planners began to
rethink symbiotic relations between the cities and their counties. As
Pannell has noted, the formation of the city region in China allows
cities to organize their functional territory as unitary systems, which
is not just a unique character of Chinese urbanization but also a
remarkable achievement, for a state so dedicated to revolutionary
change to grasp the traditional wisdom and incorporate it into
contemporary plans for one of its most dynamic parts.29 The central
city or municipality (shi), referred to as a continuous built-up
area, is subdivided administratively into various "urban districts"
(qu). Thus, urban planning began to influence the development
of infrastructure in suburban and county areas, enabling their
growth in orientation to the municipality's macro-economic policy.
Bao'an and Longgang counties, outside the Shenzhen SEZ, were
incorporated under Shenzhen Municipality's umbrella in 1993.
Witnessing the rapid growth under the market economy,
especially the booming real estate market around 1993, the
planners realized that the planning enacting process should not just
be a top-down procedure. They began to balance requests from the
general public as the planning's feedback mechanism, and public
engagement is gradually merging into the planning process, which
is critical for increasing the possibilities of government's making
"right" decisions. Absorbing urban planning experience of the past
and based on the two-tier framework, Shenzhen's urban planning
system is evolving from a two-tier system to a five layers system. It
is a notable philosophical shift-pragmatism relying on economic
efficiency and technical feasibility to justify urban planning
decisions.
Old two-tier planning-the master plan and the detailed
plan-apparently lacked coordination between the two. Shenzhen's
planning has evolved to five layers. At the top of the system is the
City Comprehensive Plan that outlines the city's general function,
the target planned size of the city, the standards, norms and
criteria for main constructions in the city, the land use structure,
comprehensive transportation system, water resources, green space
system, and strategic macro-economic and sustainable goals. The
City Comprehensive Plan also sets up the objective of regional
coordination with the rest of the cities in the PRD.
The second level is the Sub Regional Plan that coordinates
the growth of the SEZ, Bao'an, and Longgang within the city-
region and among themselves, to ensure the continuity and
integrity of the City Comprehensive Plan. The City Comprehensive
Plan only covers the Shenzhen SEZ and leaves a large part of the
city-region not covered. The Sub Regional concentrates on rational
arrangement and coordination of spatial structure and form,
infrastructure linking, land pattern, and resources within the city-
region.
The third level, the Urban District Plan (or Administrative
District Plan), is one of the efforts to link the master plan with the
Figure 60. Birds' eye view of The Windows of the World
needs of day-to-day development control. Although the master
plan shows the future urban structure, it does not specify the
detailed land uses at the land parcel level. Urban District Planning,
converting the master plan into city land layout, attempts to
complement the master plan by disaggregating land development
into urban planning districts, and to achieve better coordination
between master planning and detailed planning.3 0 Each planning
district has a set of indices to control its development intention,
land supply, and public facilities locations and layout. This level
also clearly defines the scopes of various civic infrastructure pipes
for construction purposes.
The next level is that of Regulatory Planning and
Ordinances, participated in by the general public. The plan
particularly concentrates on public goods, including public and
civic facilities, environment, use functions, and intensity. The
Ordinance level took effect in 1998 and led urban planning in
Shenzhen down a legal road. A new Urban Planning Board was
also established at the Ordinance level, which is comprised of
government officials, related experts, and societal representatives.
In 1999, the first 11 "regulatory plans and ordinances" were put
into effect in accordance with the statutory procedure.3'
The last level is Detailed Development Plan. It is used
as reference documentation of city construction according
to Regulatory Planning and Ordinances. It provides detailed
principles, such as building group layout, public interfaces, local
traffic flow directions, and environment design, for some specific
important parcels. All plans are approved mainly by the Ministry of
Construction or the State Council.
I. Mosaic Town: Huaqiao Cheng (The Overseas Chinese
Town)
Shortly after the Special Economic Zone was established,
the Central Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Shenzhen
government jointly commissioned a planning team headed by Mr.
Meng Daqiang from Singapore (born in Taiwan) and comprised of
experts from America, England, and Australia to produce a concept
plan for the Overseas Chinese Town (OCT). The general concept
plan of the OCT is based on the theory of the "large multi-function
community," with projected financing by overseas investors in
the initial stage. 2 The planning scheme suggests an adaptive
development intervention with local context and topography and a
phasing strategy that allows local developments to gradually merge
into its final plan framework. As a result, the geographical terrain
remained unaffected by the speed-driven mentality of "seven links
and one leveling" that totally ignored the local ecological context.
The old Chinese philosophy of living in harmony with nature
seemed to revive in people's memory, although present only in
such a small area of the entire city. The entire area enjoys the best
urban environment in Shenzhen and probably even in all China.
The OCT Group is a government planning and development
Figure 62. Donghai Garden
enterprise, responsible for land allotment within the Overseas
Chinese Town to all enterprises, for the city's infrastructure
construction, and for real estate development. In the meantime, it
is also an official bureau to negotiate with foreign investors, set
up at the very beginning of the Shenzhen SEZ, before the setting-
up of the comprehensive market system. In 1989, the OCT Group
established China's first theme park-the Splendid China Miniature
Scenery Park using a piece of 28.6 ha hilly land bordering on
Shenzhen Bay. Modeled on the terrain of China, the landscape
consists of 9 scenic groups placed according to their real location
in the country. A total of 74 views chosen for the first stage of the
project are all nationally well-known cultural sites. Some traditional
Chinese residential houses were built around the northern site. Its
appealing advertising slogan, "Going Back in History in One Step
and Traveling across China in One Day," has proved magnetic
and has attracted an increasing number of visitors from home
and abroad. Using the management experience of Disneyland as
a reference, the OCT Group has achieved exceptional success.
Within a year and a half, the group had earned back its investment
of more than RMB 70 million yuan. Following the success of the
Splendid China, the OCT Group later set up several other theme
parks, including the China Folk Culture Village, Window of the
World, Wildlife Zoo, and Happy Valley, which have all been
among the hottest tourist sites for an annual 40 million visitors
from China and abroad. Adjacent to Splendid China, the China
Folk Culture Village is a museum of China's 55 ethnic groups
with their distinctive architecture, customs, and exotic flavor.
Twenty-four life-size ethnic villages present various ethnic flavors
from Beijing's courtyards and wooden archway to the spectacular
buildings of the Miao, Dong, Yao, and Jingpo ethnic groups, and
from the wooded Banyans in Xishuangbanna to slender Suzhou
bridges and mysterious Lijiang houses. The Windows of the World
(Figure 60 and 61) covers 480,000 sq. meters right next to the
Splendid China Miniature Scenic Spot and the China Folk Culture
Villages. Divided into 9 areas, a total of 118 of the world's most
famous monuments and scenic wonders vie for your attention.
They include Grand Canyon, Mt. Rushmore National Memorial,
Niagara Falls, the Pyramids and Sphinx of Egypt, the Acropolis of
Athens, the Leaning Tower of Pisa, the Kremlin, the Eiffel Tower,
and the world-famous Taj Mahal. All these replicas are built on
scales of 1:1, 1:5, or 1:1.5. While the theme parks, in the south
part of the town, have attracted millions of tourists, to the north,
luxurious apartment districts situated in meticulously landscaped
neighborhoods are sought after by the rich and elite class.
The OCT is a paradoxical "collage" of world architectural
elements, abused by different real estate developers as selling
illusion points in the consumerism age. Here, on one hand,
entertaining projects such as Splendid China and Cultural Folk
Villages sought to root themselves in the soil of traditional Chinese
culture and architecture and forge a local spirit. One the other
hand, in order to take part in international interaction and adapt
to market-oriented society, without systematic digesting both,
it is superficially bringing in scenic and flamboyant alienating
images like Italian villas (Figure 63), a Venetian hotel, traditional
Chinese-style restaurants and gardens, the Eiffel Tower, and Dutch
windmills, which definitely challenged the previous identity. The
application of foreign styles did not generate feelings of insecurity
and alienation as it used to do; rather the opposite, exotic foreign
styles were somehow outlandish symbols of the prestige and
security of a modern lifestyle. The Western postmodernism that
initially started as a way out of the dead end of International Style,
now provided Chinese architects a design alternative driven by the
market mechanisms. The clash clearly indicates that a modern city
like Shenzhen lacks profound and secure guiding and consistent
ideas (theories) to create "deep" identity belonging to itself and
to be able to "modernize" some traditions, without going astray
in global plural culture and eclecticism. Architecture design
in Shenzhen, even in China, also urgently needs non-nostalgic
theoretical and procedural support to forge a new architectural
language. A convincing abstract language, not schizoid decoration,
suitable for a modernizing society, is needed to help the city image
transition from a "production backyard workshop" to a livable and
sustainable city.
We need new languages, because market forces will
"fashionize" some decoration components and strip them off from
their organic "language grammars" and make them commercially
universally applicable. Although all the schismatical and
ostentatious architectural treatment of the OCT brought quick
commercial success, in the long run, its "thoughtless pick up"
philosophy threatens ineluctably spread to the entire city and
create a fragmented city image. Actually, we can see a rendition of
this consequence from some a real estate project such as Donghai
Garden (Figure 62). Shenzhen does not need a "what you see is
what you get" post-modernism physical environment as theorized
by Robert Venturi. As Xiaodong Li pointed out "here, the adopted
eclecticism was not a tool with which to perform a critique, rather an
attempt to impose a visionary utopia out of their own fantasy." 33
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IV. City and Regional Nexus (1993-)
A. Reflection and Restructuring
Further opening up of China was precipitated by Deng
Xiaoping's Southern Tour of 1992. He encouraged the mayors of
Shenzhen and Guangzhou to speed up the formation of a market
economy and soon that encouragement spread throughout China.
The Chinese leadership stressed the national strategy of "Kejiao
xingguo" (developing the country with science, technology, and
education) in 1995. At the same time, the domestic market had
strengthened competition among cities and provinces, including to
develop technology and science, attract personnel with advanced
knowledge, and bring in foreign capital. PRD and Hong Kong
had entered a new stage of economic structural adjustment and
restructuring since the mid 1990s. Hong Kong's economy became
conspicuously dependent on financial services. Shenzhen saw this
opportunity to update its manufacturing to foster high-tech industry
through science parks which might mutually benefit both mega-
cities. Shenzhen aims to become a regional nexus of finance, trade,
information, logistics, commerce, transportation, and tourism. Such
a macro-strategic shift was also based on the fact that more other
Chinese cities were increasingly competing with Shenzhen-more
cities open to the outside world and having special policies granted
to them.
How could genuine "zero pollution" high-tech firms be
attracted to Shenzhen's high-tech science parks to make the city
a sustainable city? The city enacted about 300 laws, 70 percent of
them related to market reform. In 1998, "Regulations on Further
Supporting the Development of High-Tech Industries" and four
other regulations were promulgated.1 With legal incentives and
further exemption from income tax on high-tech industry, foreign
direct investment to the city increased 2.5 fold from 1993 to 2001.2
Shenzhen High and New Technology Park next to Shenzhen
University was established in 1996, forming the center of the 8
new technology parks (High-tech Industrial Belt) (Figure 65) with
different concentrations. Shenzhen's high-tech industrial sector,
including information technology, biotechnology, software, new
materials, and optical-mechanical-electronic engineering as its
five pillars, has experienced a phenomenal growth rate; there were
a total of 1749 industrial enterprises in 2001 and 55.5 percent of
total industrial output value was for export. Shenzhen, together
with Guangzhou, would act as testing incubators for high-tech
identified by the Ministry of Science and Technology. In fact,
the industrial restructuring strategy strongly demands substantial
regional coordination and cooperation, such as with Hong Kong,
Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and Dongguan. With rapid economic
development in the 1980s, starting in 1990 the city strives for
"synthetic effectiveness" rather than "simply efficiency," pursuing
a well-balanced market economy to grasp the opportunities of the
age of globalization and information technology. Shenzhen has
managed to move towards an "International City" with high-tech
Year Population (in thousand)
Municipality total Shenzhen SEZ
GDP
Shenzhen SE.
Total Permanent Temporary Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP per
sector (%) sector (%) sector (%) capita
(yuan")
314.1
332.9
366.9
449.5
595.2
741.3
881.5
935.6
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1531.4
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2385.3
2609.0
2949.9
3355.1
3451.2
3584.8
3796.4
3949.6
4051.3
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131.3
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1026.9
1009.8
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1189.4
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1511.8
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1751.0
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1907.1
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186
ISO
114
219
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321.9
362.0
395-3
432.1
472.8
521.4
565.2
599.6
632.8
681.2
714.8
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10.0
33.0
70.0
12.00
146.1
237.9
231.3
312.7
462.1
664.9
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765.9
747.3
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912.2
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11.9
7.3
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2.1
1.2
1.8
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1.9
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0.3
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0.4
0.2
0.2
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1.70h
1.40"
1.30"
I.20"
38.1
48.8
50.8
50.3
48.6
48.0
46.6
43.3
41.2
48.8
50.1
52.5
51.0
55.9
55.7
50.7
50.3'
49.3"
50.06
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"Current price, I RMB yuan = 8.29 U1S$.
"As some datu for the SEZ are not available, these are figures for the whole municipality, the GDP per capita of which is lower than that for the SEZ.
Sources: Shenzhen Urban Planning Committee and Shenzhen Urban Construction Bureau (1990), Shen:hen Urban Planning and Design. A
Compilation for the First Decade Celebration of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Haitian Press, Shenzhen; Shenzhen Statistics Bureau (1995),
Shenzhen Statistics Yearbook; Shenzhen Statistics Bureau (1999). Shendhen Statistics Information Yearbook, obtained from the China Statistics
Database provided by the Chinainfobank (http://www.chinainfobank.com).
Figure 64. Economic and urban development in Shenzhen Special Eco- enterprises, such as IBM, Seagate, Compaq, and Lucent. Shenzhen's
nomic Zone between 1979 and 1999
Source: James Jixian Wang, Jiang Xu, "An unplanned commercial dis- hi-tech park became among the top three of China's 52 high-tech
trict in a fast-growing city: a case study of Shenzhen, China," in Journal arks, and led the city tojointly hold an annual China International
of Retailing and Consumer Services, no. 9, 2002, p. 320.
industry, but existing Luohu downtown seems unable to fulfill the "low-ed idsial pr were moveo of the Se. The
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In 2001, after 10 years' efforts, 205 high-tech firms were reconstruction began to direct its suburban districts Bao'an and
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Figure 66. The site Plan of Diwang Plaza
form. Such a form tendency, combining with logistic corridors,
works as "antennas" penetrating into the northern hinterland.
B. Diwang Plaza
A triangular-shaped site (Figure 66, 67, and 68), next to
Shennan Boulevard and 2 km away from Luohu Customs House,
was auctioned to Shenye and a Japanese company by the city via an
international auction at the price of US$ 142 million in September
1992, when China had already gone into a macroeconomic
"soft landing" stage adjusted by the central government and the
transaction volume of real estate in Shenzhen was obviously
headed downward. It seemed that Shenye and its partner put high
expectations on the site's commercial future, especially after the
1997 Hong Kong handover. According to the government's plan,
Figure 67. South eleva-
tion of Diwang
the complex was part of the extension of Luohu commercial
district and would form Shenzhen's financial street. Shenzhen was
beginning its hardware preparation for economic restructuring and
using the Diwang project to promote a new financial street before
the realization of the new Futian CBD.
Diwang Plaza (Shun Hing Square), the eleventh highest
building in the world, is 69 main stories plus 11 stories for
equipment and refuge floors, totaling 385 meters tall, and designed
by K. Y Cheung Design Associates in 1996. A 33-story apartment
building is linked with the shopping mall through an east-west
bridge. The design was finished at a record speed of two months
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Figure 68. The structure of Diwang
and the construction in forty months, which matched the image
of the instant city. Clad in a green reflective glass, the complex is
mixed-use, made up of a shopping mall, an apartment block, and an
office tower with an observation deck at the top. The curved corners
make it sleek and futuristic, with remarkably slender proportions
(transverse width to height ratio of 1:8.78). This ratio has greatly
exceeded the criteria given in the current Chinese design code.
Shenzhen is located in a coastal area with wind activity generated
Figure 69. Diwang
either by tropical cyclones or by monsoon winds, besides other
forces such as earthquakes. Therefore, the structural system
utilized both steel and reinforced concrete (SRC) (Figure 68),
including an SRC core wall and perimeter steel frame coupled by
outrigger trusses at four levels. Two short cylinders and masts are
expressed as spires at the top with tilted volume, appearing like a
keystone wedge.
C. Huaqiangbei
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Figure 70. Huaqiangbei Road
By 1993, Shangbu Industrial Zone had mutated into
the commercial core area of an inner city next to Huaqiangbei
Road (Figure 70) with quite a number of residents living nearby;
similar things also happened in other industrial zones near the city
center. Most industrial factories were moved out of the SEZ due
to increases in labor cost and lack of service facilities in the area;
here was an obsolete zone. Some SOE landlords began to convert
some industrial buildings into stock exchange halls or retail stores
by their own decision, (as the government had less factual power
to implement its land legislation and zoning,) producing a burst of
retail growth along Huaqiangbei Road. In 1994, a large supermarket
was opened along the road in a building owned and used by Hualian
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Figure 71. Land use of Shangbu Industrial Zone in 1995
Source: James Jixian Wang and Jiang Xu, "An unplanned commercial
district in a fast-growing city: a case study of Shenzhen, China," in Jour-
nal ofRetailing and Consumer Services, no. 9, 2002, p. 321.
Development Co., one block away from Xiabumiao Residential
District and Hongli Village. The rental rate was US$ 1.15 sq ft/
month, which is one-tenth of that for commercial land use in the
Dongmen area of Luohu District (a major downtown retail area).
The store's opening ignited the flame of the process of industrial
conversion to commercial use on Huaqiangbei. In 1995, 60
percent of the former factories in the district had been turned into
commercial uses, almost all of which were not authorized by the
appropriate authority.3 By the end of 2000, 3400 businesses were
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Figure 72. Shenzhen, 1996
Source: svs. gsfc. nasa. gov/... ./shenzhen] 996_dweb.jpg
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Figure 73. Shenzhen city form, 1995
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aggregated here, including 20 bank branches, 40 security service
agents, and 20 large shopping complexes, making it the foremost
commercial core in Futian District.4 (Figure 71) This spontaneous
commercial area showed the planners that the redistribution of retail
activities driven by the market mechanism does not necessarily
coincide with planned objectives, and that it was important to
propose rationalized commercial land use. A mechanism that
can effectively adjust and implement the detailed district plan is
immediately necessary. Unlike a traditional downtown commercial
hub slowly spilling over its vicinity, Shenzhen's commercial hub
growth followed the "leap-frog" configuration of three "growth
poles (clusters)"-Luohu on the east, Shekou on the west, and one
future city center in the middle of Futian District. Each cluster has
its own commercial nucleus.
D. The Third Socio-Economic Development Plan (1996-)
Shenzhen's export processing had been set up primarily
by Hong Kong entrepreneurs on the basis of social capital or
pre-existing personal connections. Such industry was mostly
small-scale, low-tech, and labor-intensive, and environmentally
unfriendly, consuming a considerable amount of working space
and land. Rural townships and villages in the suburban area of
Shenzhen City provided land and factories to investors, resulting
in the emergence of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangzhou
corridor as the export processing locus. Agricultural production of
villages around Shenzhen, such as in Bao'an County, has become
diversified and commercialized and rural industry has expanded
dramatically: "urbanization of the countryside." Villages of the
region "left the soil but not the village," while a large number of
peasants from the rest of China flocked to Shenzhen area looking
forjob opportunities in factories. To be able to maintain Shenzhen's
leading economic position in the nation and counter-balance its
disappearing uniqueness, Shenzhen decided to incorporate the
"rural" areas outside the SEZ under the control of Shenzhen
Municipal Government and integrate them into Shenzhen's
planning strategy for better land control and interlocking of this
intensive mixture of industrial/agricultural activities.5 In 1993,
Bao'an and Longgang Counties officially turned into districts of
Shenzhen, which also provided land to replenish the city's already
shrinking land resources. "Big Shenzhen City" now has an area of
2020 sq km.
After fifteen years, the modernization of the early industry
and the surge of Hong Kong investment had encouraged the
rapid spread of development in the entire region (Figure 72 and
73). Most surrounding villages and counties started to build
their own factories and economic entities, since the city-based
economy remained under the tight control of the state, while the
countryside was relatively free to arrange its own activities. These
industrial villages and towns might not necessarily be located
close to Shenzhen SEZ and the level of industrialization has little
direct relation to the distance from the city, which implies that
the energy of development of these towns came mainly from the
efforts of local officials and peasants, rather than the municipal
administration. Their industrial products were dispersed all over
the country as well as to Hong Kong and foreign countries. At the
end of the 1980s, the industrial development had reached its high
tide, which had not only brought vitality to the SEZ, but also to the
towns surrounding it. Some industrial enterprises started to move
out of the SEZ to surrounding suburbs. The situation, however,
reinforced the high-level multi-functional service development
within the SEZ, instead of industrialization only.
All these dual-track development patterns were unanticipated
by the planners and the urban plans were lagging behind the city's
rural economic advancement. Due to a lack of proper planning
adjustment to the pattern at this time, rural land growth, based on
individual villages, spread rampantly along major highways and
roads. In the 1990s, 200 sq km of hilly areas were leveled, without
follow-up construction being carried out, which caused 170 sq km
of soil erosion and ecological problems. It must be emphasized
that rail development has had less impact on the PRD region than
road extensions, mainly due to the greater flexibility and efficiency
of road transport in effecting intercity (county) interactions,
especially over short distances. What was remarkable was the
spontaneous industrialization and urbanization of the countryside
around Shenzhen SEZ.6 This spatial restructuring was the result of
the forces of the reconfiguration of the power and capacity of the
socialist state and Shenzhen government, inflow of foreign capital,
and marketization and industrialization of the local agricultural
economy.
During this period, inside the SEZ, former native villagers
built a large amount of illegal housing on their compensated
residential lots which are permitted only up to three stories on
a base area of 80 sq m-dense city villages.7 The city did not
completely buy out the ex-farmers' lands; it compensated them with
a certain amount of sq m of lot for building their own residential
buildings. These were thoroughly out of control of urban planning.
Many villagers built apartments up to 14 stories (up to three stories
high on a base area of 80 sq m) and rented out the extra flats
to the temporary population to live in. Some city villages with
dense population and complicated inhabitant composition became
''cancers,'' causing a lot of hidden social problems.
Cities within the PRD (Figure 75 and 76) are forming
an intercity network, their economic are multidimensional
symbiotically dependent and linked with the rest of world. "Cities'
boundaries" are dissolving. Shenzhen intends to be an information,
service, and logistic node connecting Hong Kong and the rest of
the PRD, and even southern China. In his 1995 visit to Shenzhen,
Former President Jiang Zeming said "create new superiorities and
scale new heights." The mayor claimed that Shenzhen was moving
into a second "take-off' stage whose objective was to transform
a manufacturing city to a high-tech metropolis, an international
capital market, a commercial city, and .a tourist magnet. With
the population exploding from-30,000 to 1.5 million and then
to 4.7 million, and the built-up area around 300 sq km, planners
had to reaffirm the city's basic principle that the well-organized
city form extends from Hong Kong to the northwest through
Shenzhen's linear and clustered framework, permitting urban
growth and construction to be easily phased and flexible enough to
accommodate future development.
Figure 75. LANDSAT image of the PRD and Shenzhen SEZ, taken on
November 20, 2001
Source:http://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/vis/aOOOOOO/aOO2900/aOO2911/
index.html
The 1996-2010 Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan extended
the planned area beyond the SEZ to include Bao'an and Longgang
Districts (Figure78 and 79). Settlement outside the SEZ is now
also restricted within clusters which focus around the three
transport axes. (show new plan 1996-2010, transportation) The
urban use has been restricted.
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Figure 76. Major cities in the PRD
Source: adapted from Zheng Tianxiang, as shown in Guangdong.
first heads northwest through Bao'an; the second heads north
toward Dongguan; the third heads northeast through Longgang.
Open public spaces and green belts are put in between clusters to
address residual problems created by speculative and uncontrolled
development since 1979. The conversion of agricultural land to
New construction will utilize land already developed. The
city form will gradually grow to a combination of linear shape with
several radiating axes. The plan is divided into three stages, and
population will be limited to 4.3 million by 2010. The first stage
(1996-2000) remained with compact urban form based on clusters
along the transportation spines, and protection of the environment
by enforcing the intensive use of already developed land. The
second stage (2001-2010) is to build and consolidate Shenzhen into
a well-managed major livable city, with comprehensive functions
such as finance, commerce, trade, information technology, high-
tech industries, and tourism. The last stage is to establish the
city as a modern international city with strong identity within
20 years. Additionally, Yantian port in the Eastern cluster should
be developed as an international container transportation hub
and Shatoujiao and Meisha as centers for business and tourism;
Nanshan cluster should become the logistics and transportation
hub of the SEZ, as well as its education and research base. For the
towns outside SEZ, the plan limits the total population of the six
free-standing towns (Gongming, Guangming, Shiyan, Kuichong,
Dapeng, and Nan'ao).
Sustainable development principles were established in the
1996 plan. A land use conservation strategy has been developed.
The 10 categories of construction land use allow different degrees
of development intensity (Figure 82); they are industrial, storage,
I
Bao'an District
Figure 77. Building heights of Shenzhen SEZ
Source: Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Administration Bureau, Shenzhen City Atlas (Xi'an: Xi'an Meihang
Map Publishing House, 1997).
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Figure 79. Four development axes
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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Figure 80. City design guide axes within the SEZ
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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Figure 81. Major scenic traffic artery Shennan Boulevard
residential, civic and social group, commercial, public green, traffic,
road and plaza, public facility, and other land. Urban development
will be rationalized according to natural characteristics and
environmental capacity. To protect the ecological environment and
curb urban sprawl, the city is divided into different ecological zones
for the formulation of conservation policies. Educational, cultural,
sports, health, and housing facilities for various communities are to
satisfy people's material and spiritual needs. 9 The plan, however,
does not detail how these principal goals can be realized.
Based on the existing east-west linear axis of the SEZ, the
1996-2010 plan forms three other north-south axes (traffic arteries)
to thread through and connect the gradually expanding clusters
(a total of 9 functional clusters, three of which are in the SEZ),
making basic future city form structure, in order to incorporate city
structure to the surrounding city region and the natural system. The
central axis is the SEZ, which will be the economic, cultural, and
political center with a controlled population of 1.2 million. The
Western axis, passing through Xin'an, Xixiang, Fuyong, Shajinn,
and Songgang, connects with the western Dongguan, which will be
an important traffic corridor of Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou
and industrial base, with a construction area of 4942 ha. Aligned
with the Beijing-Hong Kong railway, the central axis goes through
Longhua, Buji, Pinghu, and Guanlan, toward the eastern Dongguan.
This axis would sustain international information, culture, and
technology exchange. The Eastern axis, with 1478 ha construction
land and driven by Yantian Deepwater Port, will be an important
logistic corridor and industrial base, with projected population of
180,000.
City design factors are included in the plan (Figure 80).
"The character of city against mountains and facing the sea
and cultural continuity" should be emphasized and become the
city design principles. Shennan Boulevard (Figure 81), Renmin
Road, and the central green space of Futian CBD are major a
cityscape visual axis. FAR should not be more than 4 for building
reconstruction and north-south distance between buildings should
be no less than 0.8 H (except for high-rise buildings). Average
green space per person should be 11 sq meter by 2010, while green
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Figure 82. Land use, Shenzhen Master Plan (1996-2010)
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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Figure 83. Planned road network
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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space within the residential areas should be at least 25 percent,
-and 30 percent for civic purposes.-All these numbers and design
principles are indicating that the city intend to be a livable city, as
well as a regional logistic node.
In 2003, the Municipal Government commissioned the
China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (Shenzhen) to
undertake a research study "Shenzhen 2030" to help update its urban
development strategy, facing the challenges of China's accession
to the WTO, coordination with Hong Kong, and competition from
Guangzhou and other cities in the PRD.
E. Transportation Hub
Industrial production processes taking advantage of lower
labor costs and taking place in different parts of the world have
given rise to a new mode of trade as just-in-time transportation for
freight and passengers has become increasingly reliable over the
past 20 years. In 1998, the container throughput of Shenzhen port
was 1.95 million TEUs, turning it into the second-ranked container
port in China."0 It became a trans-border ports group. In the early
1990s, the Hutchison-Whampoa Group had put heavy investment
into Shenzhen Yantian Harbor. In 1998, Hutchison International
Port Holdings Ltd acquired the Shekou Container Terminal from
the Swire Group and the R&O Group and is now responsible for the
management and operation of the container facilities, which greatly
increases the container handling capacity of Yantian Harbor.
The boom of the container throughput has made the regional
linkage system and cooperation more significant. The unbalanced
spatial pattern has caused the highway construction in PRD to occur
in an untimely and uneven manner. To alleviate bottlenecks in land
transport, many highway and railway projects have been proposed
and are being implemented. With the completion in September
1996 of the new Beijing-Kowloon railway and the second new line,
the Guangzhou-Zhuhai railway, rail service to the rest of China and
the western area of the PRD has improved and traffic has increased,
carrying most of the passengers and freight between PRD and other
parts of the country. The city's Huangtian International Airport
opened in 1991. The construction of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai
superhighway, "spine of the province," whose first phase opened
in July 1994, was an important project reshaping the nature of land
transport in the delta. Hopewell even proposed an ambitious future
project to improve the link between the two flanks of the Pearl
River estuary, which is to link Zhuhai with Shekou, with a possible
extension to the western New Territories in Hong Kong.
To ease the transportation bottleneck in the mid-1990s,
and with an increasing amount of foreign investment, Guangdong
Province completed the Strategic Plan for the PRD in 1995. The
plan, although containing insufficient detail to guide the transport
development, suggests that a well-planned, integrated transport
network of high quality and highly efficient coordination should
be established in the Delta. This network will be connected with
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other parts of the province, other provinces and southwest China
hinterlands, and Hong Kong and Macao. The function of the port
complex should be adjusted in accordance with its geographical
position in the national context, while the cargo volume should
be designed and co-distributed in the perspective of the PRD as a
whole, via major transport (logistic) corridors (Figure 83, 84, and
85). It has been decided that Shenzhen's various kinds of ports
should structurally ally with Hong Kong's to form an integrated
international hub as part of a global logistic chain, because Shenzhen
now is the only mega-city in China owning an international airport,
trans-border deepwater ports, and land customs. The city will be a
logistic node between Hong Kong and the rest of the PRD. This is
a decision associated with infrastructure that will profoundly affect
the city's long-term urban planning and, accordingly, city form, in
line with the city's economic restructuring.
To reduce the flushing effect of the Estuary within Deep
Bay, the Shenzhen-Hong Kong western corridor will be the
fourth vehicular boundary crossing, called the Shenzhen Western
Corridor, with the an associated 150 hectare reclamation at
Dongjiaotou, Shekou. The section of the highway within the
Hong Kong boundaries is about 3.2 km in length and will be
connected to the portion about 2 km in length to be provided by the
Shenzhen authorities. The proposed landing location of the bridge
in Shenzhen will be located at Dongjiaotou; each end includes a
cable-stayed bridge and approach viaducts. The proposed highway
will be connected to Deep Bay Link on the Hong Kong side at
Ngau Hom Shek. The construction work commenced in August
2003. However, any additional maj or infrastructure work, such as
the proposed bridge, that "includes dredging, dumping and marine
excavation could elevate sediment levels resulting in potential
fish kills and destruction of inter-tidal and benthic (bottom-living)
organisms.""
F. Futian Central Business District: Creating an International
City
In the 1980s, the 53-story International Trade Building,
together with old Shenzhen Town and Shekou Industrial Zone, let
the world know that China was opening its door to foreign investors
and defined a preliminary commercial district. In the 1990s, the
385-meter-tall Diwang Plaza and its surrounding high-rise groups
symbolized the initial success of the Shenzhen SEZ's economy and
the shift of its economic structure. Then what about the new goal
of the city-creating an international city and a multifunctional
economic nexus in the PRD network? 12 The Shenzhen SEZ intends
to embark on high standard business services further beyond its
physical territory. The planners anticipate that the city's ambitious
superior infrastructure and environment will continue to attract
international investment and propel rapid modernization. What
morphology can Shenzhen use to instantiate the international city
to anchor its planned functions, when market system and land
reform have already fairly matured?
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Figure 84. Existing road network
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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Figure 85. Planned comprehensive transportation network
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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Figure 86. Shenzhen city form, 2001
Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen Comprehensive Plan (1996-2010) (2000).
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Instead of building high, this time the approach is large-
scale green urban landscaping infrastructure, including eco-parks,
libraries, cultural centers, concert halls, and theaters, as well
as high-rise office towers, to differentiate Shenzhen from other
Asian cities (Figure 86). This involves using Chinese cultural and
ecological notions to dictate the new center's physical form-a
comprehensive carrier reflecting the shifted ideology for the
age of life and information society evolving and overlapping
with industrialization. It could sustain the city's green space and
protect some original topography adaptively. The carrier can also
easily incorporate and blend traditional landscaping methods with
market-required land shapes, to generate local identity and humane
amenity. The carrier is furthering the task of city's economic goal
transition while highlighting the relation of people, nature, and
economy, which are symbiotically interdependent. The city's
form and its construction, constituted locally and materially, is a
gambling response in the context of multiple and scaled globalizing
processes. Shenzhen's form development is contested in the region
to maintain the city's potential symbiotic economic predominant
posture (Figure 87).
To develop Shenzhen as a modern international city was
first brought up in the report "Shenzhen Development Strategy in
1989" by Shenzhen Urban Planning and Land Resources Bureau
and China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (Shenzhen).
Shenzhen would use the new Futian CBD to help the city transform
Figure 88. The Design concept by John Lee/Michael Timchula Ar-
chitects
Source: Carolyn Cartier, "Transnational Urbanism in the Refonn-era
Chinese City: Landscapes from Shenzhen," in Urban Studies, Vol. 39,
no. 9,,2002, p. 1522.
to a regional financial, trade, and information center over 30 to 40
years.13 The new Central District is bounded by Lianhua Mountain
(140 meters high) to the north, Bijia Mountain to the east, Mangrove
Eco Protection District to the west, and Shenzhen Bay and Yuanlang
of Hong Kong to the south, with a north-south visual and spatial
axis perpendicular to east-west- running Shennan Boulevard. In
accord with the city's new goals, the entire area is intended to set
new standards in urban planning. Since the mid-1990s, well-known
Figure 89. New Shenzhen City Hall
architects and planners abroad have been invited to help lay out
and design various elements in the district, in line with Shenzhen's
regional and international ambitions.
In August 1996, an international jury evaluated the four
entries from America, France, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and
the design by John Lee/Michael Timchula Architects was selected
as the winning scheme, whose solution featured a continuous and
undulating central public park extending along the north-south axis
and going through the major artery Shennan Boulevard. The design
(Figure 88) distinctively interprets the significance of the natural
environment by maintaining open space in the central axis and
Lianhua Mountain. The aggregated park should maintain a good
ecological environment in the dense city. A business center was
1. eco-park
2. traditional Chinese garden
3. cultural park
ill 4. city hall plaza
L5. crystal island
6.art park
7. biotope
8. Lianhua hilltop
9. Chinese medicine garden
10. ceremonial boulevard
11. earth garden
12. children's palace
. md garden
14. concert hall
- -
--- 15. library
SI16. water garden
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II Il i 118. fire garden
__ __ - __ ___ 19. north plaza20. city hall
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- T/-;distribution center
28. entrance for shopping
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33 mall
29. sunken garden
30. entrance for incubationJ L, cent
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33. cburtyard
34. biodome
Figure 90. Roof plan for Shenzhen Eco-Media city
Source: Kurokawa, Kisho, "From the Eco-City to the Eco-Media City,"
in A+U(Japan) Vol. 6, 1998, p. 25.
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Figure 91. Design concept taken from the method of music composition
using urban score and axonometric of Shenzhen Eco-Media city
Source: Kurokawa, Kisho, "From the Eco-City to the Eco-Media City,"
in A+U(Japan) Vol. 6, 1998, p. 26.
arranged to the south of Shennan Boulevard and a center devoted
to arts, culture, and administrative functions to its north. People
can see Lianhua and Bijia Mountains, and Hong Kong, from the
north-south axis formed by high-rise buildings. By establishing a
strong north-south axis and having Lianhua Mountain at the end of
Figure 92. The central axis
Source: http://www.kisho.co.jp/WorksAndProjects/Works/shinsen/
shenzhenl9.JPG
the north axis, the overall layout of the CBD somehow followed the
general arrangement of Beijing's Forbidden City. John Lee/Michael
Timchula Architects was also commissioned to design the curve-
roofed 200,000 sq m City Hall (Figure 89) with a super large-scale
roof on the top of the center, which is under construction and forms
a "gate" of the central axis. The symmetrical curved roof may be
inspired by the wings of an eagle, a symbol of the SEZ. Large
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Figure 93. The plan of Juvenile Hill
Source: Vockler, Kai, Beging Shanghai Shenzhen (Frankfurt: Campus
Verlag, 2000).
rectangular openings in the roof itself flood with light the five-
story administrative buildings, with two large pillars penetrating
through."
In 1997, Kisho Kurokawa was invited to plan the Central
Axis Public Space System to orient the urban design, which is
based on his Eco-Media City Project Plan (Figure 90) and is about
174 hectares, including Lianhua Mountain. An open space of 3
kilometers in length will be planned with the new city hall at its
center. Two traverse layers constitute the central axis, with the upper
layer composted of man-made turf supporting a park. The facilities
Figure 94. Juvenile Hill
Source: Vockler, Kai, Beijing Shanghai Shenzhen (Frankfurt: Campus
Verlag, 2000).
in the huge second layer of the City Hall will serve a multiplicity of
functions such as city offices, business support center, art gallery,
shopping mall, etc. It starts in the north with a botanical garden and
a Chinese medicine garden at the foot of Lianhua and describes a
circle around it. The design concept is taken from the method of
I
Figure 95. Green Shenzhen by Tian Kesheng (2003)
music composition using an urban score (Figure 91 and 92)1 as the
following:
1. Culture - Politics -
Technology - Art- Ecology
Science &
2. Traditional Chinese Garden -
Ceremonial Plaza -Tourist Information
Center - Eco-Media Center - Shopping
Mall - Art Park - Eco-Park
3. Spring - Summer - Autumn - Winter
4. Typical - Formal - Central - Complex
- Free15
The axis is conceived of as an incubator to use advanced
technology to create an ecological environment. This linear park
is a multi-layered structure with an accumulation of facilities,
and the roof will be a manmade park. Some eco-technologies are
incorporated into this park. Rainwater collected on the huge roof of
the main building in the city axis will be used for toilets in nearby
commercial and office spaces. To purify exhaust gas from parking
lots, the purification system will utilize the soil of the rooftop
garden. Solar and wind energy is to be used for air conditioning.
The Shenzhen Cultural Center, consisting of a central
library and a music concert hall, was designed by a famous Japanese
architect, Mr. Arata Isozaki. The entire Cultural Center building is
unique, carefully designed, and modern. It can be rated as a fine
work of modem city architecture. 6 Shenzhen Central Library is
one of the large modem cultural facilities looking towards the
information era that has been invested in by Shenzhen municipal
government. It is located in the golden area of Shenzhen's CBD,
covering an area of 2.96 hectares with a total construction area of
35,000 square meters. The new library is open-shelf, "intelligent,"
and networking-oriented. It has a capacity of housing 4 million
volumes of materials, providing 2,500 reading seats and 3,000 net
nodes. The Library will be able to serve 8,000 visiting readers at
a time and circulate 50,000 volumes per day after it is complete.
It will be the documentation and information service center and
regional library network center of Shenzhen.
The blocks 22 and 23, commissioned to SOM (Skidmore
Owings & Merrill LLP), showed the philosophy of emphasizing
the genius loci of southern China and attempting to impose rigorous
design requirements for individual buildings. Due to the previous
lack of detailed city design guidelines for individual buildings,
almost every building attempted to claim its own prominence and
maximize commercial return, without treating the city as having
integrity and considering beneficial incremental city growth. The
learning of this lesson showed in SOM's urban design. SOM's
consultancy represents the importance of the city-centre projects in
Futian as the "basis for Shenzhen's evolution and emergence as the
first, new world-class city." 17
In November 2000, a 6-meter statue of Deng Xiaoping
was erected and unveiled on the top of Lianhua Mountain.
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V. Toward the Future: Design Proposal
To a certain degree, the setting up of the Shenzhen SEZ
and other SEZs in southern coastal provinces in order to actively
pursue foreign technology and capital was a "return" to the
foreign concessionary treaty ports that flourished economically
in the earlier part of the 2 0 th century. It seems that the relatively
large size, 327 sq kin, of the SEZ helped its rapid development.
The linear land and belt-cluster urban layout facilitated the city's
light industrial production and transportation and sustained its
population explosion, which also made it easier to arrange limited
phased investment. Its linear shape has helped the city to be
adjusted to fit different economic goals and capital investment at
different stages. The amazing thing about Shenzhen is not only
its population and economic indexes explosion, but also the city's
transformation: from a manufacturing zone to a regional nexus
through the introduction of the capitalist market.
Within 23 years, the city has transformed from homogeneous
to diversified and is shifting from an industrial zone toward an
information society. Cities in the PRD are forming an intercity
network. In the information and globalization age, city boundaries
are dissolving; power and territory no longer coincide, and the state
and cities can no longer hold the two together-the virtual territory
controlled by a city may be bigger than its physical land. Cities
are becoming multidimensionally symbiotic and interdependent.
Therefore, the intercity forms' coordination, complementing, and
cooperation bring highly challenging issues to city managers,
designers, and planners. The coordination problem manifests itself
in duplication, such as the simultaneous construction of deepwater
container ports in Shenzhen and Zhuhai. Another problem is the
glut of airports, with new airports in Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai,
and Macau all completed and operational, while the Twenty-Year
Socioeconomic Development Profile of Guangdong indicates that
the largest international airport in South China will be situated in
Guangzhou.'
Land is one of the key elements of economic activities. In
the old socialist regime, the state was almost entirely dominating
all land resources; its ideology dictated the shape and growth
pattern of a city. Shenzhen's economic and population exponential
explosion indicates, at least for the success of the last 23 years,
that powerful economic growth can be expected when the ideology
of the land owner matches the global economic requirements
and opportunities. A land owner can optimize a city's phase in
the development pattern and timing, if market forces and trends
are thoroughly understood. However, it is also critical to have
an effective feedback mechanism for administrative institutions.
Starting from a comprehensive zone covering primary, secondary,
and tertiary activities, land must be available to meet the needs of
various construction and development programs. Extensive land
requiring little reclamation is essential in reducing development
costs and facilitating the progress of construction.
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Before 1993, city planning basically controlled the city's
form shape, which would follow the transportation pattern to
facilitate industrial development. As economic development
occurs, it is necessary to modify plans periodically. Plans are
usually divided into three types: target-driven, condition-driven,
and problem-driven plans. At the beginning of Shenzhen's rapid
growth, planning was target-driven, and the target often changed
dramatically, just as reflected in Shenzhen's master plan. In this
situation, plans become outdated very quickly and modifications
should be made in time. After 1993, as most manufacturing was
moving out of the SEZ in response to globalization, the planning
process shifted from supporting state projects to regulating
undesirable land development.
The development of Shenzhen is a process of both
urbanization of the city's surrounding region and its comprehensive
infrastructure upgrading. The growth of Shenzhen has been
essentially a process of optimization of its infrastructure, starting
from upgrading gravel roads, building new ports, providing
water and electricity, expanding interfaces with Hong Kong, and
improving telecommunication. Shenzhen has been intending to
strengthen its link to the global urban network and in order to
become a logistical, informational, services, tourism, and high-
tech nexus between the PRD city network and one of the second
tier of global cities, Hong Kong,2 within the next 10 to 20 years.
In a forum on Shenzhen's economic development in September
2003, Liu Jiasheng, director of the Shenzhen Municipal Bureau
of Urban Planning, said the city would speed up construction of
infrastructure facilities, particularly projects linking Shenzhen to
Hong Kong and other Pearl River Delta metropolises. Beginning in
August 2003, the 5-kilometer "Western Corridor" will consist of a
dual 3-lane expressway and connect Shekou in Shenzhen with the
western part of Hong Kong. Co-funded by the Shenzhen Municipal
Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and scheduled to open in late 2005, the new road link is expected
to boost the mutual development of Hong Kong and the mainland,
and, in particular, to further hone the competitive edge of the
Pearl River Delta region. A bridge project which links Shenzhen's
Huanggang Port to Hong Kong's Lok Ma Chau Checkpoint will
also be completed by the end of 2004. The new bridge will boost
development of finance, logistics, and tourism, and better position
Shenzhen as the node between Hong Kong and the Pearl River
Delta.
To become a multiplex regional node, I think the city
should have a sustainable living environment, with well-built
infrastructure for the information age. Its form transformation
should not necessarily follow previous belt-cluster models, but
foster a sustainable and livable city environment to create its own
identity to enhance its competitiveness. The city's seafront form
provides valuable opportunities and a decent physical platform to
fulfill the city's next macro goal. Shenzhen is actually a seafront
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city. However, this apparent character seems to have been
forgotten, except for continuous landfill and using seafront for
ports. Binhai Express Road, a coastal road, was constructed on one
section of landfill and this express road in fact cut the people's daily
connection with the western coastal area.
I propose three phased bay area developments in the next
20 to 30 years: a living bay, an information bay, and an ecological
bay (Figure 96, 97, and 98). The overall design intention is to
reconstruct inter-cluster bay areas while cleaning the bay areas;
waste water will be rechanneled and treated and water ways
connecting to various reservoirs will be reclaimed. Shenzhen and
Hong Kong are the only two mega-cities in the world so close
together. The ecological bay is to protect existing mangrove trees
and establish a reasonably large eco-buffer zone between the two
mega-cities. In the postindustrial age, the new global order is
based on the ability to store and process information and generate
knowledge. Therefore, the information bay, a knowledge incubator,
should be located next to Shenzhen University and Shenzhen High-
tech Park. In 2000, the Shenzhen government announced that there
will be no residential land available within the SEZ. The living
bay will thus provide extra land for living purposes. All three
refilled new bays will provide large green public seafront spaces
to enhance people's connection with the sea area and protect the
natural environment.
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, urban form
development can be considered as a series of diagrams of dynamic
intervening forces. To build a sustainable and humane environment
is a major challenge in the information economy age in the midst of
globalization. This design proposal is seeking a contested city form
suitable for the age, in which humanity and sustainable aspects are
emphasized. Such a form will enable Shenzhen to remain a leading
city node in the intercity network of Pearl River Delta in the 21st
century. The economic feasibility of this design would require
study next. I hope this study about Shenzhen SEZ's morphological
change provides valuable experience for other rapidly transforming
cities in China and perhaps elsewhere.
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IYueman Yeung, Globalization andNetworked Societies (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2000), p. 99.
2 Mark Abrahamson, Global Cities (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), p. 5.
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